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THE TRANSITION BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM

• CHARLES BETTELHEIM
• PAUL M. SWEEZY

ZIMBABWE: EXPLOITATION AND LIBERATION

• MWANA WEVU
• DAVIS M'GABE

Brazil's Northeast KIT SIMS TAYLOR

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CONTENTS | VOLUME TWENTY NUMBER TEN MARCH 1969

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: On the Transition Between Capitalism and Socialism by Charles Bettelheim 1
Reply by Paul M. Sweezy 10
BRAZIL'S NORTHEAST by Kit Sims Taylor 20
ZIMBABWE: EXPLOITATION AND LIBERATION:
Partners in Plunder by Mwana Wevu 30
The Beginning of Guerrilla Warfare by Davis M'gabe 39
CORRESPONDENCE: The French Explosion by Ken Geering 52
Reply by the Editors 54
On the Events in Czechoslovakia by Bernard Galitz 54
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 58

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EDITORS: Paul M. Sweezy and Leo Huberman (1903-1968)

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

A memorial meeting for Leo Huberman was held on January 12th at the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles. Dr. Steven Fritchman, pastor of the church, acted as chairman and those who spoke or sang were Blackie Myers, Yip Harburg, Kay Cole, Earl Robinson, Jamie Huberman, Jimi Kaufer, Charles Katz, and Rod Gorney. We plan to publish the transcript of the earlier New York memorial meeting and will probably add material from the Los Angeles service.

The complete spring list of MR Press's new books is announced on pp. 48-51 of this issue. The total of 17 titles is about twice as large as the press used to publish in a whole year, which means—since the spring list is a half year's output—that we are now producing books at about four times the former rate. All of the titles except *Socialism in Cuba* will be ready for shipment dates this month, and *Socialism in Cuba* will be ready before the end of April.

Please place your orders right away, but remember that our shipping department will be strained to the utmost with so many new titles to

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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ON THE TRANSITION BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

By Charles Bettelheim

What follows is the text of a letter addressed to Paul M. Sweezy, together with a reply. Charles Bettelheim is the Director of the Centre d'Etudes de Planification Socialiste at the Sorbonne in Paris. His latest book, *La Transition vers l'économie socialiste* (Paris, Maspero, 1968), will be published in English translation by Monthly Review Press. The translation of Professor Bettelheim's letter is by Alfred Ehrenfeld.—Ed.

I read with great interest your article on "Czechoslovakia, Capitalism, and Socialism" in MR (October 1968). It contains many important and accurate statements—especially those in which you say that the Czech reforms were strengthening the existing system, and stress the fact that what was involved was a new step along the road of capitalism (you say: "in the direction of capitalism"). Your denunciation of the confusion of "juridical categories" with "real relations of production" is similarly an indispensable correction. This applies equally to your remark that capitalist ownership is not necessarily "private" ownership (personally, I think that it may be more appropriate in this context to speak of "individual" ownership, since capitalist ownership as a social relationship is always "private" ownership—that of a class—even if it assumes a "social" juridical form; I think that when Marx speaks of "the abolition of capital as private property, within the boundaries of capitalist production itself," his target is precisely "private" ownership *in the juridical sense*). Some of your conclusions also strike me as very correct, particularly your statement that "in the final analysis . . . the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a sign of Soviet weakness in the face of a growing crisis in the bloc as a whole."

Your article, however, also contains elaborations which strike me as erroneous, and which I would like to discuss. I shall limit myself to two basic problems: (1) the problem of the nature of socialism, and (2) the problem of the roots of the

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trends toward the restoration of capitalism (hence, of the origin of this restoration where it has already clearly taken place, as in Yugoslavia).

I begin with the second point.

Your thesis seems essentially the following: the trend toward the restoration of capitalism has its "origin" in the role attributed to the *market,* in the reliance on *material incentives,* and in *organizational forms* (what you, on p. 6 of your article, call control of the enterprises "in the enterprises themselves").

I think, however, that this list only designates "secondary facts"—*indices or results,* and not the *decisive factor.*

In my opinion, the *decisive factor*—i.e., the *dominant factor*—is not *economic* but *political.*

This decisive political factor (the importance of which you unfortunately appear to deny in the last pages of your article) results from the fact that the proletariat (Soviet or Czech) *has lost its power to a new bourgeoisie,* with the result that the revisionist leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is today the instrument of this new bourgeoisie.

It is impossible to *explain* the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the international political line of the USSR (the character of its relations with the United States and with China), or the "reforms" and the results toward which they tend (the full development of the "market," and the economic, political, and ideological domination over the masses made possible by market forms), unless it is recognized that the proletariat is no longer in power.

To list as the primary factor—as you do—not class relations (the existence of a bourgeoisie which "collectively" owns the means of production) but *market* relations is due, it seems to me, to an error in principle, and leads to a number of other errors.

The error in principle is the very one you denounce at the end of the note on p. 7 of your article; there you say that in order to understand the nature of a mode of production (or of a social formation), "one must dig deep below the surface to uncover underlying relationships and processes." But to put emphasis on the existence of a "market" (and therefore also on the existence of money and prices) in defining the nature of a social

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formation, means precisely to put emphasis on the *surface,* on what is immediately "apparent"—it is consequently a failure to come to grips with underlying relationships. These exist at the level of production, i.e., at the level of basic social relationships. It is the system of these relationships that produces determined *effects* (economic, political, ideological) on the agents of production. One of these essential effects may be to *divide* the agents into *social* classes and place these classes in *determined objective relationships* (of domination, exploitation, etc.).

The practice (economic, political, ideological) of the *agents* and particularly of the political leaders can be understood only in terms of the place they occupy within the system of social relationships.

The error in principle—putting emphasis on surface phenomena,* on the existence of a market, money, and prices (which existed also before the Twentieth Congress and which exist in all the socialist countries), and on the practice of the leadership with respect to the "market" (a practice which precisely should be *explained*)—leads inevitably to other errors.

The most serious of these errors concerns the problem of the nature of socialism; I shall therefore deal at some length with a few of your formulations.

You very correctly condemn the use of the term "market socialism," but your reasons for this condemnation strike me as theoretically inadequate.

It is correct to condemn the use of the term "market socialism" chiefly because this term places a one-sided emphasis on the existence of market forms in socialist society. It is here that this term reveals its ideological character; it indicates an ideology which favors a considerable development of market

* I think that in the analysis of a social formation two kinds of "errors" (i.e., of ideological approaches) are readily made. One is to "limit" the "analysis" to *juridical forms* (this is the error you denounce); the other is to "limit" the "analysis" to *economic forms* (this is the error which you make, and which is also present in any discourse on political economy concerned only with *forms*: exchange, money, prices, market, etc.). *In both cases no true analysis takes place,* since *the emphasis is precisely on forms,* i.e., on what is "manifest," whereas analysis must reach the "underlying" elements which the manifest content dissimulates (while at the same time "revealing" them).

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relationships, when in fact such a development (which is possible only under the domination of a bourgeoisie) leads to the full restoration of capitalism.

But your criticisms are of a different nature.

On the one hand, you denounce not the *development,* beyond a certain point, of market relationships, but the very *existence* of market relationships; moreover, you *isolate* this existence and therefore disregard the *social and political conditions* which make the full development of market relationships possible. You thereby grant a "privileged" status to these *forms,* which are posed without reference to the conditions without which it is impossible to give a "description" of their significance. In doing this—and here I repeat the statement I have made earlier—you grant a privileged status to a secondary fact, a surface fact, and obscure what is essential and primary: the basic social relationships, the class relationships.

On the other hand—and this follows from the preceding point—your argument, in my opinion, rests on an important confusion. You say that the term "market socialism" is "contradictory." Formally this is obviously not an argument, since all reality is contradictory. The only problem then is to know whether the verbal expression of a reality and of the contradictions which characterize it *is adequate or not*—i.e., whether these contradictions are *analyzed* in scientific terms or only *shown* in ideological terms.

With respect to the contradiction which forms the subject of this discussion and which you designate as one which assumes the form of a contradiction between "plan" and "market," the very fact that this is a contradiction in practice indicates that it is neither a "verbal" contradiction nor an "ideological contradiction" (in the sense of a contradiction inherent in a certain ideological "conception" of socialism), but that it *expresses,* in *terms that are still ideological,* a *real* and effective contradiction.

Moreover—and I believe that here lies the root of our disagreement—the contradiction "plan"-"market" designates an essential contradiction in socialism viewed as a *transitional* or *passing* form; this contradiction is the *surface effect* caused by a deeper contradiction, by the basic contradiction in the tran-

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sitional form which is obviously situated at the level of the production relationships and productive forces. In certain cases this surface contradiction becomes the principal contradiction, but it can never be correctly dealt with if it is not viewed in relation to the structure of the production relationships and the productive forces.

The preceding means that the contradiction between "market" and "plan" will continue throughout the transition from capitalism to communism.

What characterizes socialism as opposed to capitalism is not (as your article suggests) the existence or non-existence of market relationships, money, and prices, but the existence of the domination of the proletariat, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is through the exercise of this dictatorship in all areas—economic, political, ideological—that market relations can be progressively eliminated by means of *concrete* measures adapted to *concrete situations and conjunctures*. This elimination cannot be "decreed" or "proclaimed." It requires political *strategy* and political *tactics*. When these are lacking, the finest proclamations may lead to the opposite of one's stated (and hoped for) goal.

The notion of a "direct" and "immediate" abolition of market relations is as utopian and dangerous as the notion of the "immediate abolition" of the state, and is *similar in nature*: it disregards the specific characteristics (i.e., the *specific contradictions*) of the period of transition which constitutes the period of the building of socialism.

The *trend* of the evolution at the level of *forms* (the development or retreat of market forms) is an *index* of the evolution of social relationships, but it is no more than an *index*. To "limit" oneself to this index—without elucidating the movement of the contradictions that determine this evolution—may therefore be completely misleading In certain circumstances the proletariat which has assumed power may also be forced into strategic or tactical *retreats* on the economic front.

It goes without saying that in order for these *retreats* not to be transformed into *defeats* the first condition is that they be clearly understood as such and not understood (and "presented")

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as "victories," for the ultimate aim is the complete elimination of market relationships; there can be no doubt that this is possible only with the disappearance of the state, and this can be achieved only through the establishment of communism on a world scale.

If in the Soviet Union the restoration of bourgeois domination is accompanied by an *extension* of the role of the market, this is evidently because this domination cannot be complete ("accomplished") except through the full restoration of market relationships; this is, moreover, the reason why this restoration can be understood only as an effect, as a secondary phenomenon, and not as a primary phenomenon.

Another error (and it is a "transformation" of the preceding one), it seems to me, is the assertion that the existence of the "market/plan contradiction" is an impelling force leading toward the restoration of capitalism (this is stated in your note cited above).

In reality, at the level of forms this contradiction is not an impelling force leading toward anything. *Everything depends on the manner in which it is dealt with,* and this manner depends itself on class relations, including those existing at the ideological level.

I wish to add that I consider it useful to present these criticisms because the formulations you advance—and which you are not alone in advancing (they are found especially in the speeches of Fidel and the writings of Che)—result objectively in producing *effects of ideological obscurantism.*

These formulations in effect mask the essential problem of socialism, that of power, the defense of which under certain conditions may even require, as I have recalled earlier, retreats on the economic front (e.g., the NEP). If your formulations were taken literally, Lenin, in favoring the NEP—i.e., in "strengthening the market"— supposedly "promoted capitalism."

The effect of ideological obscurantism stemming from the formulation I am criticizing manifests itself particularly in your analysis of the "economic reforms." Reading this analysis, one has the impression that at the time they decided on these reforms, the Soviet leaders supposedly could have made a

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"choice" between two "techniques": "One would have been a cultural revolution in the specific sense that the Chinese have given to that term. . . . The other response was to rely increasingly on the discipline of the market and the incentive of profit." (p. 11)

But what is involved here is not a "choice" between two techniques that would enable the economy to "progress," but a *line of demarcation* between two political courses, between two classes.

To be sure, the problem that remains to be solved *on the historical level* is that of the concrete process which made possible the reconstitution in the Soviet Union of a powerful bourgeois class and its accession to political power. The Twentieth Congress as a matter of fact could not have had its particular content or effects if there had not *already* existed social relationships unfavorable to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is also a good indication of the fact that the development of these social relationships was not "determined" by the development of the market, but on the contrary was *anterior* to it.

On the theoretical level, on the other hand (and here too I find myself in disagreement with your article), the declarations of the Communist Party of China concerning the Cultural Revolution, its objectives and methods, clearly elucidate the *ideological* and *political* conditions that must be realized before the threat of a bourgeois restoration can be successfully opposed. These declarations, to be sure, are not only theoretical; they contain also numerous *concrete* discussions of the *concrete* conditions in China. These declarations therefore cannot be "applied" mechanically, but their theoretical core has universal value.

I will add that in given historical circumstances the effect of ideological obscurantism mentioned earlier is increased through an effect of displacement. This occurs when the ideological positions which provoke this effect of obscurantism "feed" a political practice. Such, I think, is the case of the political practice of the Cuban leadership (which I consider it necessary to discuss briefly at this point).

If this leadership attaches so much "importance" to prob-

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lems of market relationships—to the point of making them the "center" of its ideological conception and political practice—this cannot be the result only of a subjective "error." In my opinion, this is the effect of an ideology and a political line which concentrate all power in the hands of a ruling group, and which therefore do not create the necessary conditions—ideological, organizational, and political—for the democratic exercise of proletarian power.

On the one hand, this political practice has a class significance which cannot be analyzed here; I shall say only that it is related to political domination by a "radicalized" section of the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it produces *necessary consequences*—i.e., consequences that force themselves of necessity on a government that "appeals" to socialism.

One of these consequences is precisely an *ideological displacement*: the *identification* of socialism *not with the dictatorship of the proletariat* (consequently with the power of the laboring masses, with the domination of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, with the practice by the revolutionary leadership of a mass line, etc.) but with the "disappearance" of market relationships.

This "disappearance" is evidently purely *mythical,* for it cannot take place under the given concrete conditions which include of necessity the existence of money and prices, so that the fact of "denying" this existence leads to the opposite of the desired aim—notably to the development of a black market. In spite of speeches and repression, the effects of real relationships always end by imposing themselves.

The *substitution* of the myth of the "disappearance" of the market, money, etc., for the necessary dictatorship of the proletariat obviously involves a *political line*—a line corresponding to precise social forces and a precise ideology.

The speeches of the Cuban leadership,* especially Fidel's

* Political *analysis,* of course, must never interpret ideological speeches literally. Here, too, *analysis* takes place only when one goes beyond the surface of the speech, consequently beyond its *manifest* "meaning," in order to uncover its *latent* meaning, the meaning which the terms of the speech at one and the same time dissimulate and reveal. Such an elucidation must first of all locate those passages of the speech in

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speech of August 23, 1968, confirm this: what the Cuban leaders "criticize" in the developments which took place in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries is not the restoration of a bourgeois dictatorship, or even the absence of proletarian democracy and a mass line, but only *certain* effects of a class domination which, precisely, *remain unmentioned.*

---

which "masking" occurs; such passages constitute "critical points." These are naturally of various kinds, depending on the ideologies involved; but they present themselves frequently in the form of "myths," which are signs of the *unthought,* of obsessive and passionate themes that must be analyzed, so that a meaning may be uncovered other than the apparent one—a meaning which is no more "present" in the consciousness of the author of the speech than in the consciousness of the listener or the reader who naively responds to the literal meaning.

In the speeches of the Cuban leadership, especially since 1964, these obsessive and mythical themes are constituted by the "market," "money," "prices," the "calculations" of economists, etc. On analysis, these themes appear to be the "signifiers" by means of which very different "signifieds" are "repressed" (and "represented"): whatever "threatens" a highly concentrated political power which has raised itself above the masses. These "threats" (thought of as "threats against socialism") present themselves in the manifest form of the "market," "money," etc.; but beyond this form they "represent" the masses, their labor (which must be properly *accounted* for, if this labor is not to be arbitrarily wasted), their aspirations, their always possible spontaneous movements (the speech of August 23, 1968, which denounces precisely the "spontaneity" of market relationships is quite "significant").

It is the presence or absence of these unthought "signifieds" which fuels the vehemence of the speeches against money and market relationships.

In real political practice it is clearly possible to distinguish between a proletarian practice and a non-proletarian practice.

The former is constantly preoccupied with "financial strictness," stable and declining prices, with raising the standard of living of the masses by lowering the prices of widely used consumer goods. This was one of the concerns of Soviet policy until the Twentieth Congress. This is the constant concern of Chinese policy. Such a concern is not "fetishism"; it stems from respect for the labor furnished by the masses, and for their rights.

The second practice is indifferent to inflation or shortages, and conceals this indifference by speaking contemptuously of "economic, monetary, and financial" problems. This contempt, however, is in actual fact contempt for the labor of the masses and their rights. It has therefore *the same character* as contempt for proletarian democracy, for the free expression of opinions by the masses. If this second kind of contempt cannot be expressed but must be *repressed,* the first kind, however, may assume an *ideological form* enabling it to affirm itself openly. This form thus reflects a *dougle signified*—one "thought" in ideological terms (i.e., in reality not thought), the other strictly "unthought."

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These effects are not mentioned because the Cuban leaders themselves do not *see* them. They do not see them because their ideology makes it impossible for *this crucial problem* even "to present itself" to them. In their eyes, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is "assured" by the existence of certain "forms" (a certain juridical form of ownership, a certain organizational form of the Party, a certain form of expression, etc.) and not by concrete social and political relationships.

If I have insisted on emphasizing the ideological effects of the central role which you attribute to the "market/plan" contradiction, this is because the fact of granting such a role to this contradiction (which is no more than a contradiction at the level of *forms*) *makes it possible, in ideological representation, for this contradiction to occupy the place occupied, in Marxist analysis, by the fundamental bourgeoisie-proletariat contradiction.*

Under given political conditions, this displacement also makes it possible to mask the real problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism, since these problems involve above all the development of the proletariat-bourgeoisie contradiction. This "displacement" consequently produces at one and the same time *ideological* effects and *political* effects.

REPLY

By Paul M. Sweezy

At the outset I want to thank Professor Bettelheim for his carefully considered critique. It continues and in some respects goes beyond his important work *La transition vers l'économie socialiste* which, as he says in that book's preface, is devoted to a "group of theoretical and practical questions which become

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increasingly important from year to year but on which there are very few studies."*

There is one crucial respect in which it seems to me that the above critique goes beyond the book. Let me quote again from the book's preface:

> What lends unity to the chapters which follow is that they constitute the beginning of a new critical reflection bearing on problems which are currently described as those of the "transition toward socialism." It will be seen that this expression is far from being adequate to the reality which it pretends to describe. What it does is to evoke a "forward movement" of which the destination, more or less assured, would be socialism. Now what in fact is described in this way is an historical period which can be more accurately characterized as being that of "the transition *between* capitalism and socialism." Such a period does not lead to socialism in a linear fashion; it may lead there, but it can also lead to renewed forms of capitalism, notably to state capitalism.
>
> That this possibility exists appears progressively in the course of the chapters which follow; but it is not made the object of an explicit formulation before Chapter 6 [the last in the book]; and in addition the terminology employed reflects this conclusion only partially.

What are called chapters in the book are all previously published essays, and their arrangement is roughly chronological, covering the years 1964-1967, with the last (Chapter 6) having been written more than a year after any of the others (both Chapter 6 and the preface are dated August 1967). From these facts it seems that we can deduce that up to a few years ago Bettelheim still held what I think can be called the traditional Marxist view that the transition from capitalism to socialism is a one-way street. By 1967 he had altered this to allow the *possibility* of a regression to capitalism. And by the end of 1968 (the above critique is dated December 15), he states without qualification that a new bourgeoisie is in power in the Soviet Union—also in Czechoslovakia and by implication in the other Warsaw Pact countries—and that "the Com-

* I had not yet read the book when I wrote the piece on Czechoslovakia for the October issue of MR. If I had, I could perhaps have expressed my thoughts in a way which would not have given rise to some of the misunderstandings noted below.

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munist Party of the Soviet Union is the instrument of this new bourgeoisie." What was considered a possibility in 1967 is thus adjudged a *fait accompli* in 1968.

Let me hasten to add that in tracing this evolution of Bettelheim's position on the character of the transition period, I intend no criticism. Quite the contrary. Under the stimulus of the polemics between China and the Soviet Union plus personal observation in Yugoslavia, MR's editors had concluded as early as 1964 that the transition period is a two-way street (see "Peaceful Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?" in this space, MR, March 1964). But, as that editorial made clear, we were not satisfied with the Chinese treatment of what had happened in Yugoslavia, and we felt that there was a crying need for more extensive and more profound analysis of what is evidently a crucially important problem. Fortunately, there are few if any Marxists better qualified than Charles Bettelheim to help fill this need. The appearance of his book and the further extension of his ideas along the lines of the above critique should set the stage for a lively and fruitful discussion.

First, then, an attempt to clear away certain misunderstandings. If I read him correctly, Bettelheim attributes to me the view that the very existence of "market relationships, money, and prices" is incompatible with socialism and makes impossible a transition to socialism; and a large part of his critique is devoted to an attack on this position. The evidence on which he relies is apparently the footnote which begins on page 7 of my piece in the October issue of MR. On re-reading the footnote I can see how it might lend itself to this interpretation, thought it certainly did not occur to me at the time of writing. In any case, I want now to make clear that I never had the slightest intention or inclination to espouse the view Bettelheim attributes to me. The view I do hold is that market relationships (which of course imply money and prices) are *inevitable* under socialism for a long time, but that they constitute a standing danger to the system and unless strictly hedged in and controlled will lead to degeneration and retrogression. In the words of the March 1964 editorial:

We are not suggesting that production for profit can be im-

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mediately abolished, still less that a socialist society can hope to dispense with market relations in any near future. But we are saying that production for profit must be systematically discouraged and rapidly reduced to the smallest possible compass, and that market relations must be strictly supervised and controlled lest, like a metastasizing cancer, they get out of hand and fatally undermine the health of the socialist body politic. (p. 588)

Essentially the same point was made by Paul Baran and me in somewhat different terms:

Marx emphasized in his *Critique of the Gotha Program* that the principle of equivalent exchange must survive in a socialist society for a considerable period as a guide to the efficient allocation and utilization of human and material resources. By the same token, however, the evolution of socialism into communism requires an unremitting struggle *against* the principle, with a view to its ultimate replacement by the ideal "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." . . . This is obviously not to imply that the communist society of the future can dispense with rational calculation; what it does indicate is that the nature of the rationality involved in economic calculation undergoes a profound change. And this change in turn is but one manifestation of a thoroughgoing transformation of human needs and of the relations among men in society. (*Monopoly Capital,* p. 337n)

And I was at pains to state in the article criticized by Bettelheim that the important thing is not the existence of market relations in the Czech economy or even their present scope as compared to centralized planning; rather, "what is important is . . . the direction in which the system is moving, and here there can be no doubt (a) that the weight of the market elements has been growing for at least the last five years and (b) that one of the purposes of the liberalizing reforms of the last eight months has been to remove obstacles to the further streamlining of the Czech economy along market lines."* (p. 8) And again: "The contention is that whoever acts to strengthen

* This is of course a very summary statement which does not take account of the possibility of *temporary* and *reversible* moves in one direction or the other. As Lenin saw it, NEP was precisely a move of this kind. But the increasing reliance on the market in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe today is something entirely different. It is not regarded as a temporary retreat but rather as a socialist advance which receives ideological approval and legitimation.

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the market instead of struggling against the market is, regardless of intentions, promoting capitalism and not socialism." (p. 11)

A corollary of this position is that the market/plan contradiction is not an absolute contradiction in the sense that the two forces cannot exist side by side; it is a contradiction in the sense that the two forces are in opposition to each other and are necessarily locked in an uninterrupted struggle for dominance. The question here is not how extensively the market is used, but the degree to which the market is used as an *independent* regulator. And of course this is not in the least a question of economic "laws" or of the consequences of certain economic forms. Rather it is a question of state power and economic policy. I must therefore reject entirely the line of criticism so much stressed by Bettelheim, to the effect that I am concerned only with surface phenomena, economic forms, secondary facts, etc. On the contrary, I am concerned with those ultimate questions which are decisive for the society of transition: the questions of the location of power and its uses to determine whether the society moves forward to socialism or backward to capitalism.

This leads logically to a consideration of Bettelheim's theory that a new bourgeoisie has come to power in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries and that it is only because of this that market relations have been encouraged and extended in recent years. He clearly believes that the Twentieth Congress marked a turning point in this process, but he also affirms that it "could not have had its particular content or effects if there had not *already* existed social relationships unfavorable to the dictatorship of the proletariat" and adds that this is "a good indication that the development of these social relationships was not 'determined' by the development of the market, but on the contrary was *anterior* to it."

I see the process in question somewhat differently, with the relationship between the development of a new bourgeoisie and the extension of the market being not a simple one of cause and effect but rather a dialectical one of reciprocal interaction. First comes the consolidation of power by a bureaucratic

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ruling stratum (not yet a ruling *class*), accompanied and followed by the depoliticizing of the masses. Without revolutionary enthusiasm and mass participation, centralized planning becomes increasingly authoritarian and rigid with resulting multiplication of economic difficulties and failures. In an attempt to solve these increasingly serious problems, the rulers turn to capitalist techniques, vesting increasing power within the economic enterprises in managements and relying for their guidance and control less and less on centralized planning and more and more on the impersonal pressures of the market. Under these circumstances the juridical form of state property becomes increasingly empty and real power over the means of production, which is the essence of the ownership concept, gravitates into the hands of the managerial elite. It is this group "owning" the means of production which tends to develop into a new type of bourgeoisie, which naturally favors the further and faster extension of market relations. This process implies an erosion of the power and privileges of the "old" bureaucratic ruling stratum, with the result that conflicts develop between what the capitalist press calls the "liberalizers" (new bourgeoisie) and the "conservatives" (old bureaucrats). The latter, however, have no program to cope with the society's mounting economic problems and so can do little more than fight rearguard actions against the advance of the market- and profit-oriented new bourgeoisie. The logical end of this process, which has nowhere yet been reached (and of course may never be reached), is the establishment and legitimation of new forms of corporate private property. Only when this has occurred will we be able to speak of a new ruling class in the full sense of the term.

In practice Yugoslavia has traveled further along the road to capitalism than any other country, certainly much further than the Soviet Union where the old bureaucratic ruling stratum became extremely powerful and well entrenched in the three decades of Stalin's rule. It seems to me that the present phase of development in the Soviet Union can best be interpreted as one in which the bureaucratic elements, under the leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin, are attempting to stem the further advance of the new managerial elite. For reasons already in-

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dicated, I doubt that they can succeed—though of course they may slow down or even halt the process for quite a few years.

In my piece on Czechoslovakia I said that there are two possible responses to the failures of bureaucratic planning, one being increasing reliance on the market and the other "a cultural revolution in the specific sense that the Chinese have given to that term: an all-out campaign to rouse the masses, to elevate the general level of political consciousness, to revitalize socialist ideals, to give increasing responsibility to the producers themselves at all levels of decision-making." Bettelheim interprets this to mean that I believe "the Soviet leaders . . . could have made a 'choice' between two 'techniques.'" Actually, I used neither of the two words he puts in quotation marks. I said, as above, that there are "two possible responses," and I added that for historical reasons the Soviet leadership was incapable of making the cultural revolution response. It should therefore be apparent, I think, that I have no disagreement with Bettelheim when he writes that "what is involved here is not a 'choice' between two techniques that would enable the economy to 'progress,' but a *line of demarcation* between two political courses. . . ." But when he adds "between two classes," I am not sure that I follow his thought.

If he means that one political course (reliance on the market) is in the interests of the new bourgeoisie, and the other (a cultural revolution) is in the interests of the proletariat, I understand and agree. But if—as seems more likely from other passages—he means that which course will be followed depends on which class is in power, then I confess that I do not know what kind of *concrete* phenomena he is referring to. Take the Chinese case, for example. There is little doubt that a bureaucratic ruling stratum was growing and consolidating its power in China during the 1950's and early 1960's. By 1966 it seems clear that it already had a majority in the Central Committee of the Communist Party and occupied most of the decisive posts in the central and regional administrations. Most likely it would have soon moved in the direction of capitalism already pioneered by the Eastern European countries. But Mao and a small group of faithful followers refused to acquiesce in this retrogression. Using the at least partly spontaneous Red Guard

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movement as their initial weapon, they launched the Cultural Revolution, roused the masses, unseated the bureaucratic leaders, and in this way insured that China would continue on the road to socialism at least for the present and near future.

Would Bettelheim "explain" this process by saying that up to 1966 the proletariat was losing power to a new bourgeoisie but then at the last minute turned around and reasserted its class dominance? If we assume that Mao and his group (including the decisive leadership of the mass media and the Red Army) are "instruments of the proletariat," then the statement becomes a mere truism. But what is the ground for making such an assumption? What do we really know about the role of the proletariat or of Mao's relations to the proletariat? Do such "explanations" add anything to our understanding of what actually happened in the past or is likely to happen in the future? Do they not, on the contrary, tend to convey a vastly oversimplified and hence misleading impression of the relations between social classes and political leadership in the transitional society? My own view, which is certainly subject to alteration in the light of further evidence and study, is that it is precisely in the transitional societies, or at least in a particular phase of the development of the transitional societies, that the "determinist" elements in historical causation are weakest and the "voluntarist" elements most significant.* If this is so, it means that in analyzing these societies we must be specially on guard against thinking in terms of dogmas and formulas.

Bettelheim's interesting remarks on the Cuban situation could easily form the starting point for an extended discussion. I will content myself with two points: (1) I think he greatly exaggerates the extent to which Fidel is under the sway of what Bettelheim calls the myth of the "disappearance" of market relations, money, prices, etc. Fidel knows, and has said on numerous occasions, that it is impossible to abolish overnight these economic categories inherited from capitalism. At the same

* For a discussion of the roles of determinism and voluntarism in Marxist theory, see Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, "Lessons of Soviet Experience," MR, November 1967, pp. 18-20.

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time I believe Bettelheim is right in implying that serious errors have been made by the Cubans in shaping and implementing their economic policies. (2) I do not believe—and this is essentially a point that has already been made—that it helps to explain the nature of these policies and errors to say that they are "related to political domination by a 'radicalized' section of the petty bourgeoisie." This is a formula, not an explanation. For the rest, my views on the Cuban situation are set forth in considerable detail in Leo Huberman's and my book *Socialism in Cuba,* which will be ready for distribution in the spring.

In closing I want to say that though a discussion of this sort perhaps unavoidably stresses differences of opinion, nevertheless I find myself in far-reaching agreement with Charles Bettelheim's views on the transition economy as expressed in his book *La transition vers l'économie socialiste.* In particular I agree wholeheartedly with his penetrating analysis of property relationships in the transition society. As summed up by his friend Gilles Martinet, Bettelheim's theory

> underlines . . . the relativity of the notion of property. Each economic unit is answerable at one and the same time to the state and to its own management. When the planning is overriding and rigorous, the state exercises to the maximum its powers as owner. But when planning becomes indicative and when the autonomy of the management permits an enterprise to make its own investments, to negotiate contracts, to decide on its production processes, this enterprise tends to substitute for the fiction of state property a new form of collective property.*

I would prefer the term "corporate" to "collective" here since, at least in English, the latter is often used to refer to the whole society. But in substance this expresses in elegant form one of the crucial facets of what I called the plan/market contradiction.

I am hopeful that at long last we may be taking the first steps toward a viable theory of what is surely, along with imperialism, one of the two decisive phenomena of the world scene in the second half of the twentieth century, the society

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* Gilles Martinet, *La conquête des pouvoirs* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1968), p. 95.

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in transition between capitalism and socialism. But at the same time we should recognize that they are only first steps and that we need to know a great deal more about what is happening in the transitional societies. Bettelheim has perhaps done more than any one else to open up a tremendous and exciting field of study.

(February 4, 1969)

Power and property may be separated for a time by force or fraud —but divorced never. For so soon as the pang of separation is felt... property will purchase power, or power will take over property. And either way, there must be an end to free government.

—Benjamin Watkins Leigh,
Nineteenth century Virginia statesman

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BRAZIL'S NORTHEAST: SUGAR AND SURPLUS VALUE

BY KIT SIMS TAYLOR

An introduction to economics, for most North American students, comes in the form of a textbook and a series of lectures presenting the "neo-classical/Keynesian synthesis," but my introduction to economics was in the cane fields of Pernambuco, where, as a Peace Corps Volunteer, I worked with an emerging rural labor union. Shocked by the specter of malnutrition in a fertile land and hoping to find a solution, or at least to understand the cause, I took up the study of agricultural economics at a North American university. But it was not what was taught in the classes which helped me to draw together the many things which I had observed; rather it was Andre Gunder Frank's *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* which led me to the threads which unified my observations. Had I read Frank's book before living in Brazil, I am certain that I would have regarded it as unrealistic and dogmatic, but everything which I saw supported Frank's analysis.

Freeing the Negro without freeing the land is but half an abolition.
—JOAQUIM NABUCO (19th century abolitionist)

The sugar sector of Brazil's Northeast, which is the dominant sector in the regional economy, provides almost a textbook example of the Marxist theory of capitalist development. The history of the region is the history of the dominant class manipulating institutions so as to expropriate the maximum possible surplus product from the region's rural laborers. Slavery, feudal-type labor relationships, and the daily wage are all clearly seen to be nothing more than the means by which profit has been, and is now, extracted; and not as traditional and inviolable

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institutions. The capitalistic concentration of the means of production into fewer and fewer hands stands out clearly, as does the subsequent awakening of the laborers to an awareness of their class interest.

The Northeast, a region larger than Peru and containing about 25,000,000 people, is the Western Hemisphere's largest concentration of disease, malnutrition, and human misery.*[1] With little industry, land is the primary means of production, and land ownership follows the latifundia-minifundia pattern which is so common in Latin America.[2] While most of the region consists of arid and semi-arid land which is subject to devastating periodic droughts, it is in the humid and fertile coastal regions of Paraiba, Pernambuco, and Alagoas where the human condition is most miserable. Josué de Castro, a former director of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization, has characterized the Northeast's humid area, known as the *zona da mata,* as a region of endemic hunger, while noting that the population of the semi-arid interior suffers only from periodic epidemics of hunger.[3] The *zona da mata* is entirely dominated by sugar-cane agriculture, and as many as two million people may be directly dependent on the sugar plantations and mills. Although the Northeast as a whole has an annual per capita income of $140, that of the sugar-cane worker and their families is well under $50; and the infant mortality rate of this group may be higher than 50 percent.[4]

While the existence of such a large number of people at the margin of subsistence is in itself a serious problem, it is with the wider aspects of the problem that many Brazilians have become primarily concerned. The land which is monopolized by the sugar interests is, potentially, the Northeast's most productive land, as well as being the closest to the major population centers. As a result of this land's being devoted to cane, the cities must import foodstuffs, at high transportation costs, from the semi-arid Northeastern interior and the more developed Central-South (particularly from the states of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo). Celso Furtado, formerly the director of SUDENE (the federal agency responsible for the region's development)

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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and now in exile, recognized the food importation problem as one of the mechanisms by which the sugar latifundia have prevented the region from achieving a more rapid rate of industrialization.[5] As low-paid industrial wage earners spend the major portion of their incomes on food, food costs are the chief component of the subsistence-plus-urbanization-costs which determine the industrial wage rate in a labor surplus economy.[6] Thus wages in the Northeast have necessarily been high relative to the skills available when compared to Brazil's Central-South (see table). This has frustrated SUDENE's efforts to attract industry into the region. In addition, where the supply of food is rather inelastic (i.e., does not increase rapidly in response to price increases), as it is in the Northeast, wage increases won through union pressure are quickly lost through rising food costs.

To understand the depth of the problem as it exists today,

TABLE
COST OF LIVING INDEXES FOR FOODSTUFFS IN CAPITALS, JANUARY, 1965
(1948=100)

Northeastern Capitals		*Central-Southern Capitals*	
Recife	8195	Rio de Janeiro	7053
Natal	8032	Sao Paulo	6672
Maceió	8030	Belo Horizonte	6488
Bahia	7889	Vitória	6466
Joao Pessoa	7801	Curitiba	6442
Fortaleza	7674	Pôrto Alegre	5885
Aracaju	7482	Niterói	5840
Average	*7872*	*Average*	*6407*

Source: Conselho Nacional de Estadística, *Boletim Estadístico,* No. 92, October/December, 1965, pp. 33-38. These figures are based on actual expenditures on foodstuffs and therefore considerably understate the differences in food prices, since the Northeasterner does not consume either the same quantity or the same quality of food as does the Southerner. Niterói, being primarily a working-class suburb of Rio de Janeiro, probably offers the most accurate comparison with the Northeastern cities. Also, it is to be noted that these indexes represent price *changes* and do not carry the assumption that regional prices were equal in the base year. It should also be noted that, among Northeastern cities, Fortaleza, in a region of very low rainfall, has a lower index than does Recife, which is surrounded by cane fields.

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it will be necessary to review the history of the sugar industry from its beginnings to the present day. African slavery accompanied the development of large-scale capitalist agriculture in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, such development in vast and unpopulated lands would have been impossible without slavery. Marx, in his chapter entitled "The Modern Theory of Colonization," told the story of a Mr. Peel, who took 3,000 "persons of the working class—men, women and children—to Australia, expecting them to work on his plantations. But, with land available for the taking, the laborers preferred to start their own farms, and Mr. Peel was left without a labor force."[7] The capitalist can only expropriate the surplus product of the laborer when the laborer has no independent access to the means of production (in this case, the land); if a man has the option of taking his own subsistence from the soil by working for two days a week, and the capitalist will trade him his subsistence for six days' work, we would expect his choice to be two days of work for himself and four days of production for the market. And even where the dominant class completely controls the marketing system and can prevent the small farmer from marketing his surplus produce, the small farmer will "trade" his potential surplus product for leisure.

The expropriative mechanism in the slavery era of Brazilian sugar production was quite visible. Subsistence crops such as manioc, corn, and beans were complementary with sugar cane, since cane cutting and milling, which had high labor requirements, generally took place from September to April, while the subsistence crops could be planted and harvested between late March and mid-September. From March to September the slaves were allowed one day per week, plus saint's days, to plant, cultivate, and collect their own subsistence crops.[8] At all other times, the slaves worked in the cane fields or at the mills. The slave's diet was the bare minimum necessary for labor and survival, consisting primarily of manioc flour, which is almost entirely carbohydrate. When the slaves escaped and formed their own colonies in the backlands, which they often did, it is reported that their diet was considerably improved and more varied.[9]

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In Brazil, as in other slave areas of the Western Hemisphere, the abolition of slavery only became a political issue when there was a population sufficient to guarantee a large labor force and when the dominant class was in sufficient control of the means of production to guarantee its control over a "free" labor force. Brazil had a large unemployed population by the early 19th century, and free laborers worked side by side with slaves on the plantations and in the mills.[10] The *zona da mata* had been entirely in private hands since the mid-18th century, and Brazil's geography and institutions did not lend themselves readily to the type of westward movement which was then taking place in the United States. In addition, by early in the 19th century, Brazil was no longer one of the most important countries producing sugar for the international market, much of her production being for the domestic market. Under these conditions it was difficult for the plantation owners to utilize more than two or three days of labor per week from each available laborer. This situation led to the development of the *morador* system, a quasi-feudal labor arrangement wherein the worker received, in exchange for two or three days of labor per week, a plot of land on which he and his family could cultivate crops for their own subsistence and sometimes even a marketable surplus. Although the labor force was completely free by 1888, the landowners attenuated the mobility of the workers by extending credit which the worker could never entirely repay. In this manner a labor surplus was maintained in the Northeast even while the coffee growers of Southern Brazil were importing wage laborers from Europe.

While the *morador* labor relationship was feudal in appearance, it was capitalistic in nature: the sugar plantations had not atrophied completely into independent fiefs but continued to produce for a market external to themselves. Indeed, as Furtado points out, true feudalism is only possible when a lack of durable goods severely limits the accumulation of wealth.[11] Nowhere in Latin America is there a large-scale agriculture which is not integrated with the world economy: the classification of Latin American agriculture as feudal is a "myth" which has been clearly exploded by Andre Gunder Frank.[12]

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From 1890 to 1940 the political and economic power of the region gradually became consolidated into fewer and fewer hands. The plantations of the 19th century had been of from 200 to 1,000 hectares and had contained their own water or animal-driven sugar mills. By 1900 most of the primitive mills had been replaced with small steam mills, but these were to be short-lived since large central mills had already begun to dominate the industry. The central mills could produce nearly twice as much sugar from a given amount of cane as the small mills, and the sugar from the small mills was of a quality which was becoming unacceptable on the international market. Moreover, the Brazilian government, in an attempt to regain Brazil's former position in the international market, guaranteed foreign loans for the construction of large central mills.

It was hoped that this policy would result in "rational" production, with mill ownership and operation separate from plantation ownership and operation. But the central mills were interested, above all, in securing a supply of cane and avoiding competition. The rapid spoilage of cane and its lack of alternative uses give tremendous market power to the processing sector: thus, the plantation owners had no alternative but to sell their properties to the mills when the mills demanded to buy them. In 1914 there were 785 small steam mills in Pernambuco; by 1942, 60 central mills owned almost 60 percent of the Pernambuco cane lands. In addition, many plantations which are not legally owned by the mills are effectively owned by them, due to long-term leases and interlocking families. The old plantation owner class has practically disappeared. Many central mills own more than twenty plantations, and these are now managed by low-paid administrators. This concentration of ownership is aggravating the current food situation, since independently owned land might be expected to switch from cane to food production with rising food prices, but land owned by a mill will continue to produce for the mill as long as the total field/factory operation remains profitable. Unlike the land, the mill has no alternative uses.

After the Second World War sugar prices rapidly rose to more than double their prewar levels. The *moradores* were

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gradually forced off the land and the dominant labor relationship became a daily wage paid on the basis of the worker's production. Furtado assumed that the reason for this was the landowners' need for the land formerly used by the *moradores,* but information now available indicates that the mechanism operating here is entirely different, that it was the greater need for labor, not land, which transformed the *moradores* into a rural proletariat.[13] Land tenure studies of two counties in the *zona da mata* of Pernambuco show that nearly all of the land in the area is owned by sugar interests. The accompanying graphs (see page 27) are of land distribution in the Pernambuco counties of Escada and Igaraçu: Escada, in the center of the *zona da mata,* has practically no small properties; Igaraçu, directly on the coast, has numerous small properties, probably around the fishing villages, but most of the land area is divided into the large holdings of the sugar interests. A conservative estimate of the sugar-cane latifundia's domination of the humid areas of Paraiba, Pernambuco, and Alagoas, would be that it owns 80 percent of all land. Yet studies by the Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais in Pernambuco indicate that only 15 percent of the *zona da mata* is planted to cane,[14] and the conservative newsweekly *Visao* reports that less than 20 percent of the *zona da mata* of Pernambuco is utilized for cane, the remainder being used for practically nothing.[15] We can see that, with 80 percent of the land *owned* by the latifundia and 20 percent *used* by it, less than a quarter of the land available to the cane planters is actually used by them.

It would appear, from the amount of unused land under plantation and mill ownership, that forcing the *moradores* off the land and introducing a wage system was an economically irrational act on the part of the latifundia, since under the *morador* system no wages were paid and, even after the rapid extension of cane planting in the 50's and early 60's the latifundia still had enough unused land to offer, rather than money, in exchange for labor. But the problem confronting the latifundia was the amount of labor it needed under the new market conditions. With the possibility of intensifying production, from five to six days of labor per week were needed from each

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LAND TENURE IN TWO PERNAMBUCO COUNTIES



Source: Mario Lacerda de Melo and Jerônimo Lemos de Freitas in Mario Lacerda de Melo, *As Migraçoes para o Recife — I — Estudo Geográfico* (Recife, Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais, 1961), Fig. No. 1.

worker, whereas previously, only two or three days of labor could be utilized. If the labor force had access to its means of subsistence, it could not be forced to work a full week at low wages. With the new price conditions, the additional three or four days of labor which could be extracted under a wage system more than compensated the landowners for their cash-wage expenditure.

By the late 50's, workers who had formerly grown their own food and a small marketable surplus were buying food in the open markets of the towns and in the exploitative company stores on the plantations. Food prices rose much more rapidly than did wages, and by 1960 the market value of the cane worker's daily wage was less than one kilogram of manioc flour.[16] While he was confronting a decline in his already low standard of living, the cane worker was also becoming aware of his social position, aware of his class. As Furtado points out, the *morador,* practically self-sufficient, was not aware of any norms different from those of the plantation; but the wage earner, forced off the plantation and buying his food in the marketplace, was

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exposed to a new set of norms and became "conscious of a responsibility for his own destiny."[17]

The most significant expression of the cane worker's new awareness was the *Ligas Camponeses,* the Peasant Leagues, led by Francisco Juliao. One of the stated goals of the Leagues was to turn over the cane lands to the workers. An indigenous peasant leadership nurtured by Juliao, several priests, and an assortment of federal and state (Pernambuco) organizations, was able to turn the 1963 Rural Laborer's Statute into an effective vehicle for rural unionization. Indeed, so effective were the new unions in raising wages that the cane workers were able to buy machine-made products such as bicycles, transistor radios, and rubber boots. However, the relative prosperity of the Northeastern cane worker was short lived. Francisco Juliao, Miguel Arraes (Governor of Pernambuco), and Celso Furtado were among the many Northeasterners who were either exiled or imprisoned by the military dictatorship which came into power with the coup of 1964.

The rural unions still exist in the Northeast, but they are watched closely by a hard-line military government which can say who is and who is not qualified to be a union official. The wage level has fallen far below its 1963 high mark, and no one mentions land reform any more, at least not too loudly. But the cane worker's class awareness is not dead and cannot be stamped out. One rural-labor union official was describing the Brazilian flag to me, with its motto of "Order and Progress." He said that it was an apt motto for Brazil, and that every peasant knows that it really means "progress for the rich and order for the rest of us."

NOTES

1. Stefan H. Robock, in *Brazil's Developing Northeast* (Washington, 1963, p. 1), calls the Northeast the "major underdeveloped region in the Western Hemisphere."
2. On the relationship of the latifundia to the minifundia, see: Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1967), pp. 46-48.

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3. Josué de Castro, *Geografia da Fome* (Sao Paulo, 1965), pp. 36-37. [*The Geography of Hunger* (Boston, 1952), p. 38]
4. If a cane worker had a family of only five and received the legal minimum wage for twelve months a year with no lay-offs, the annual per capita income in his family would be $48. Actually, very few workers receive the full minimum wage, and many are laid off for several months each year.
5. Celso Furtado, *Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis* (Berkeley, 1965), p. 118.
6. On the subsistence-plus-urbanization-costs wage rate, see W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," pp. 400-450 of A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, eds., *The Economics of Underdevelopment* (New York, 1963).
7. The account of Mr. Peel and the Swan River Colony first appeared in Edward Gibbon Wakefield's *England and America* in 1834. Marx used the incident as an illustration of the fact that "capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things" (*Capital,* Kerr edition, Vol. I, pp. 839-840). The figure of "3000 persons of the working class" is apparently a misprint as Wakefield, cited by Marx, used the smaller figure.
8. Manoel Correia de Andrade, *A Terra e o Homen no Nordeste* (Sao Paulo, 1964), p. 80.
9. de Castro, *op. cit.,* p. 114.
10. Celso Furtado, *The Economic Growth of Brazil* (Berkeley, 1965, pp. 151-152.
11. Celso Furtado, *Development and Underdevelopment* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 91-92.
12. Frank, *op cit.,* pp. 219-277.
13. Furtado, *Diagnosis,* pp. 132-133.
14. *Brasil Açucareiro,* April, 1968, p. 5.
15. *Visao,* May 24, 1963, p. 19.
16. Furtado, *Diagnosis,* p. 143.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 129.

To decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to misrepresent the people in parliament is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism, not only in parliamentary-constitutional monarchies, but also in the most democratic republics.

—Lenin

We may take it . . . that the thief who is in prison is not necessarily more dishonest than his fellows at large, but mostly only one who, through ignorance or stupidity, steals in a way that is not customary. He snatches a loaf from the baker's counter and is promptly run into jail. Another man snatches bread from the tables of hundreds of widows and orphans and simple credulous souls who do not know the ways of company promoters; and, as likely as not, he is run into Parliament.

—George Bernard Shaw

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ZIMBABWE: EXPLOITATION AND LIBERATION

PARTNERS IN PLUNDER

By Mwana Wevu

This analysis will not concern itself to any extent with details of the Rhodesian crisis which have already received wide currency. The objective is primarily to place the relevant events in proper context so that the nature of the crisis may be understood in order to permit the requisite response to it.

The crisis was not specifically born of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of November 11, 1965. That declaration merely brought to a head—and not surprisingly—a long historical process that had begun with the conquest and colonization of the country at the end of the last century. The process was inaugurated in fairly classical style: a commercial company (under Cecil Rhodes, that "South African" mining millionaire, adventurer, and infamous apostle of empire) was set up to explore the lands (to the north of the Limpopo) and to preempt similar moves by other imperialist adventurers (primarily Boer, Portuguese, and German). Agents of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) were sent out in advance and, in collaboration with "missionaries" who had ingratiated themselves with the local population, "treaties" were duly manufactured and imposed on defrauded native rulers.

By the time the Africans began to realize the import and extent of the fraudulent "treaties," the country had begun to fall prey to an advance detachment of the colonizers. The colonizers

Mwana Wevu is the pseudonym of a Zimbabwian graduate student in a Western country who has been active for many years in the freedom movement of his nation.

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claimed an international legal title to the land, based not only on the "treaties," but also on a "royal charter" duly granted to the company by the queen of England. The Africans, finding no option whatever, launched a resistance movement which made settler rule precarious until about 1900. The permanence of settler rule was confirmed in another 23 years when 34,000 settlers were granted extensive political power over the African population, then numbering about 900,000.*[1]

This background, however simplified and synoptic, presents the origins of what came to be called Southern Rhodesia, and highlights some of the main features that helped shape subsequent events and tendencies. The country historically originated as an extension of South Africa, which itself already formed a segment of British imperialism's acquisitions on the African continent. The second-level status of the country in the chain of command of empire is attested to by various political arrangements. For example, though control over the administration of the new colony was ostensibly vested in the British government, real local power was in the hands of BSAC. The company was, however, required to give some account of its activities through the official British representative at Cape Town. This apparently tenuous relationship operated only at the political level; but the satellization of the colony, as we shall see, was every bit as thorough in economic terms.

The tenuousness of imperial control politically, however, served to rivet Rhodesia's ideological and other ties to South Africa, and to make it "logical" and "inevitable"—especially from the point of view and the calculations of the imperialist metropolis—that the country should follow the political and socio-economic patterns already firmly established in South Africa. Since those patterns had already received official British sanction, as evidenced in the granting of independence to South African racists in 1910, it was considered "normal" that Rhodesia should develop the same way.[2] All subsequent political developments were influenced by such expectations of British imperialist strategists. The "opposition" to UDI by the government of Prime

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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Minister Harold Wilson completely lacks credibility on this score. Why?

The interests of Britain and of the Rhodesian settlers coincide in a more fundamental way than we have thus far indicated. The question is often raised why Britain has not intervened militarily to liquidate the treason of the Rhodesian settler-colonists. Various explanations are suggested: (a) Britain's chronic financial and economic problems preclude any possibility of her mounting an expensive and possibly long-drawn-out military engagement in far-off Rhodesia; (b) it would be far better to explore all possible avenues to a peaceful settlement than to undertake military operations which would harm both innocent and guilty alike; (c) "public opinion" in Britain would be opposed to the British army fighting their "kith and kin" in Rhodesia. Not only would there be a risk of British army mutiny but, the argument goes, "no one can seriously suggest in present conditions that the [British] government can immediately send in troops."[3] Thus, it is argued, Britain has no alternative but to seek negotiations with the Ian Smith fascists while applying pressure via U.N.-sponsored economic and diplomatic sanctions.

As to the arguments above, point (a) has no validity since the same economically ailing Britain maintains vast imperialist bases and troops "east of Suez," in West Germany, and elsewhere. Moreover, British imperialism did not hesitate to use these same troops in 1967 in vain attempts to suppress the armed revolutionary struggle of the people of South Yemen. The cry of "economy" was not raised then. Point (b) is essentially specious, as we will demonstrate later. Point (c) has some valid peripheral relevance, but it is not an important determinant of Wilson's policies.

Fundamentally, such explanations of British policy options miss the point. Any expectation of British military intervention in Rhodesia is a deliberate obfuscation or is misguided and betrays a naive lack of reality. Rhodesia is and always has been an integral part of a monopoly-capitalist, metropole-satellite relationship in which the exploiting metropolis (Britain) expropriates economic surplus from her Rhodesian satellite for her own development.[4] As a direct colony of Britain, Rhodesia could only

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stand as an area of plunder and exploitation for British capital. Direct British capital investment amounts to well over $300 million, by far the largest investment stake of any foreign country.

In an economy which, for an underdeveloped country, shows considerable structural diversity (the contribution of agriculture to national product is only around 21 percent),[5] most sectors are dominated by British capital typically represented by proxy branches of giant British monopoly combines. A few examples: 90 percent of the country's output of asbestos is produced by the British concern of Turner and Newall; the British firm of London & Rhodesia (LONRHO) controls extensive gold mining, plantation, and ranching interests, and owns the country's only oil pipeline, Beira/Umtali; the Rhodesian Wattle Company owns nearly all of the country's wattle acreage and itself is a subsidiary of Forestal, Land, Timber and Railway Company, "one of the world's largest producers of tanning products."[6] British monopolies such as Imperial Chemical Industries and Imperial Tobacco Company control virtually all chemical, fertilizer, and similar lines of production, as well as the sale of tobacco abroad. "Well over one third of the 50 largest British manufacturers have direct interests (subsidiaries and not merely sales organizations) in Rhodesia. As a result the presence of 'giant corporations' can be observed in practically every sector of the Rhodesian manufacturing industry, with a relatively greater concentration of British capital in the first stages of production and South African capital at the other stages (including distribution)."[7] The domination of foreign capital, with British monopoly capital as the most dominant and pervasive, is so complete that over 65 percent of the net recorded operating profits of all private companies were recently found to accrue to such foreign interests.[8]

Of equal interest to the domination of the Rhodesian economy is the mutuality of interests, amounting to a collaborative partnership, of British *and* South African capital. The concrete expression of this partnership is the octopus-like Anglo-American Corporation (AAC), whose mining and related interests extend from South Africa throughout all southern Africa to the Congo.[9] This AAC group (which now includes the "original" BSAC)

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is heavily involved in Zambian copper mining. In Rhodesia itself, the single most significant operation of the group is coal mining, centered at Wankie in the Zambezi Valley. The coal is vital both for Rhodesia's power needs and for copper mining activities in Zambia. Its control, therefore, by one of the two "giants" of Zambian copper mining constitutes an astute investment and business operation. The group also has interests in ferro-chrome and cement industries, and other activities financed from the super-profits of the Zambian copper Eldorado.[10] With the virtual amalgamation of the AAC and the BSAC (the latter more strongly under British control) and their subsidiaries in Rhodesia, an intricate pattern of mutual stockholding and interlocking directorships has been established. This not only undergirds the satellite economy of the colony but also plays a vital role in safeguarding settler political hegemony. The hegemony is achieved in at least two ways:

First, the press. The entire daily press of Rhodesia and its provincial subsidiaries are owned exclusively by the AAC-dominated Argus group of newspapers. These papers relentlessly and dutifully preach the gospel of white supremacy and the undesirability of an African government. Their alleged liberalism is actually rank paternalism. Their support of the status quo is persistent.[11] Their obtuse racism is demonstrated in this excerpt from an editorial: "Their behavior [of some African patrons at the opening of a new beer tavern] was inexplicable unless it be that even among those Africans who have approached closest to the Western way of life there remain the ineradicable traces of primitiveness [sic] which occasionally spring to the surface. . . ."[12]

The second form of political participation by the monopolies (aside from financial contributions to the party in power) is more subtle. It consists of using persons highly placed within the monopoly directorates and the British ruling class for behind-the-scenes political maneuvering. For example, Lord Malvern, former prime minister of Southern Rhodesia and of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now defunct), is a board member of BSAC and, by virtue of a title earned in the service of the empire, is a life member of the British House of Lords. Sir Frederick Crawford, board chairman of BSAC in Rhodesia, as a

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former governor of Uganda is another faithful servant of the empire who no doubt advises London regarding the proper treatment of "natives." The role of Mr. Emrys-Evans is described by Kwame Nkrumah as follows:

> Mr. Emrys-Evans is a director of Anglo-American Corporation, as well as of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd. He carries the interests of Barclays Bank D.C.O. by his directorship of the bank, and his solicitude for Rhodesia's development is implicit in his seat on the board of Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd., a British South Africa Company subsidiary.[13]

Apart from investing some of their huge profits outside central Africa as Nkrumah points out, these integrated combines pay considerable taxes to the governments of Britain and South Africa.[14]

We begin now to see the satellite nature of the Rhodesian economy and its almost absolute domination by monopoly centered in and directed from two metropolises, South Africa and Britain, of which the latter is the principal. At this level the interests of both metropolises are in near-perfect harmony, even to being formally cemented in various collaborative arrangements. Only at the political-diplomatic level does any difference appear between Britain, on the one hand, and Rhodesia and South Africa, on the other, and even this difference is one of tactics and timing.

Britain, of course, would not be opposed to an African majority government in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), given certain contingencies. From British imperialism's point of view, such a government would in fact be advantageous, particularly if it could (a) serve to mollify international criticism and concern, and (b) comprise elements whose interests and orientation were ultimately pro-imperialist; that is, elements which would preserve the present two-level neocolonialist satellization of the country, and seek to deepen it. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be an indigenous African bourgeoisie, preferably in alliance with reactionary chiefs. Such an alliance would have a chance of success if the bourgeoisie could command support among the urban masses, and the chiefs could take care of the rural areas. Because of a variety of factors, however—some of

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which will be listed below—it has not been possible to realize this alliance, whose reality remains valid only in the hopes and dreams of the Wilson regime and its predecessor. But if conditions for an African puppet regime are unfavorable, as we suggest, and if monopoly profits are in fact guaranteed under a loyal settler regime, why then has the Wilson regime even pretended to fight Ian Smith? Why not instead keep and defend settler-ruled Rhodesia, as in fact the Rhodesian regime has constantly urged the British and their "free world" allies to do?

The answers lie in differing appreciations of relevant tactics to preserve imperialist interests in South Africa and elsewhere, on the part of metropolitan Britain and satellite Rhodesia (aided by her South African and Portuguese allies). The British do not press for installing an African puppet regime in Zimbabwe (as in Malawi or Botswana) because the very idea grates violently on Rhodesian settler sensibilities. For them—and this includes, despite wishful allegations to the contrary, all sectors of settler opinion—talk of any significant African political "advance," let alone majority rule, is preposterous. The African is, after all, "utterly incapable of taking over the responsibilities of the government of this country," as one leading figure of the Smith regime has put it.[15] This determination is considered so axiomatic that no arguments are even adduced to support it. (We are, of course, paying the Smith regime the compliment that it is capable of producing a pretense of an argument in support of absurdity and irrationality.)

In view of this settler intransigence, and perhaps also because of the inherent risks of an "African-majority-rule" neocolonial option, the Wilson government has started a desperate search for a "tokenist" option. Tokenism here would involve the enrollment of a few more Africans on the voters' lists, promotion of a few more Africans in the "civil service," construction of a few more African schools, etc. This would be backed up by a few constitutional tricks, such as an African parliamentary "blocking-third," the increasing of African parliamentary representation up to one-third-plus-one of the total. This is a device ostensibly to block any retrogressive constitutional amendments that might be initiated by a settler membership of two thirds or

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over. These constitutional tricks are inspired by considerations of British diplomacy in international forums. They are motivated also by the interests of monopoly whose geographical spread is, of course, not limited to southern Africa but encompasses much of the so-called third world, and especially the neocolonial "British Commonwealth of Nations." British imperialism seeks to pacify its critics in the U.N., the Commonwealth, and elsewhere by perpetrating on Zimbabwe Africans any political charade, no matter how abject, as long as it can be passed off as "democratic." This is the logic of Wilson's vaunted "six principles," which supposedly form the basis of any political settlement. One principle proclaims that "there shall be no oppression of the minority by the majority, nor any oppression of the majority by the minority."[16] However, since oppression of the majority by the minority is a cardinal law of empire and has been the central tenet of Rhodesian settler rule (a rule promoted and backed by British imperialism itself), the "oppression" that this particular "principle" pretends to outlaw is a people's democratic majority government. Mr. Wilson himself is in fact on record as saying that the possibility of such majority government cannot be measured by the imperatives of a clock or calendar but by the "progress" Africans make in converting themselves into civilized (read: neocolonial) subjects of imperialism. (Lord Malvern even inserted the proviso that even when Africans reach this neocolonized paradise they cannot be guaranteed its "joys" since "that will depend on our grandchildren."[17])

But even tokenism is unacceptable to the settler regime and its followers. The settlers see no reason whatever for any "compromises" to humor Africans. After all, even "tokenized" Africans might advance to demand more. The settlers moreover, see no reason for sacrificing some of their privileges simply to rescue the imperialist metropolis — Britain — from its diplomatic-strategic embarrassment with the rest of the neocolonial empire. This point is well understood by the settler leaders. One of them observed: *"I think it can be accepted that Britain's attitude in bending over backwards to prevent the breakup of the Commonwealth may be the correct decision politically for Britain, but the effect on Rhodesia is catastrophic."*[18] (Emphasis in original.)

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Because of the intransigence of the Rhodesian settlers over political tokenism, imperial Britain has been left with no option but to attempt a show of "opposition" to the wayward settler regime—hence the economic sanctions launched and "tightened" with such fanfare over the past two and one-half years. But contrary to popular belief elsewhere, these sanctions are not intended to bring down the Smith regime. The objective is to strengthen the hand of the waverers and so-called moderates within the settler establishment so that negotiations for the imposition of a new variant of tokenism may be resumed. But since these sanctions have predictably failed abysmally, not only has the UDI gamble been vindicated before the settlers, but the most rabid sectors of settler reaction have also received an immeasurable political boost. Thus their current quest for new conquests by means of more thoroughgoing and systematic apartheid; imposition of the most savage punishment on anyone breaching the innumerable so-called security laws (for example, mandatory death penalty for anyone carrying "weapons of war," including axes, and bows and arrows); and removal of even the most minimal and inevitably truncated socio-political rights open to Africans. It is these tactical minutiae which both define and accentuate the "impasse" that now separates London and Salisbury from what would otherwise be a neutral embrace born of common interests and objectives.

With the exhaustion of the sanctions tactic, London most likely will henceforth leave the situation in abeyance, in hopes either of an international recognition of the *de facto* reality of settler hegemony, or of renewed negotiations at some indefinite future time. Either way the settler dictatorship (from the point of view of the metropolitan center) is officially assured of both survival and continued prosperity. The only way this prospect can be altered is through the precipitation of a sustained war of national liberation by the Africans of Zimbabwe themselves.

NOTES

1. Figures estimated from Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959, p. 14.

2. Indeed, in 1923 the settlers had been given complete freedom by London to join the Union of South Africa, but they turned this down in favor of a substantial degree of local autonomy.

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3. See John Hatch, "Rhodesia: War or Surrender," *New Statesman,* November 17, 1967.
4. These concepts are borrowed from Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
5. R. B. Sutcliffe, "Rhodesia and Economic Sanctions," Paper delivered at a Conference of the Zimbabwe Students Union, London, 1965.
6. Giovanni Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," *New Left Review,* No. 39, p. 50.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
9. A more detailed analysis of the interests and activities of this "octopus" is available in Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism,* London: Nelson, 1965, pp. 110-161.
10. See also Arrighi, *op. cit.,* pp. 49-50.
11. Leys, *op. cit.,* p. 89.
12. *The Sunday Mail* (Salisbury), October 18, 1959.
13. Nkrumah, *op. cit.,* p. 160.
14. *Ibid.*
15. See Desmond Lardner-Burke, *Rhodesia: The Story of the Crisis,* London: Oldbourne, 1966, p. 69.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See P. Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership,* Baltimore: Penguin, 1963, p. 224.
18. Lardner Burke, *op. cit.,* p. 70.

THE BEGINNING OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

By Davis M'gabe

"Chimurenga" is a Shona word which means war of liberation. Shona is the language of the native peoples of Zimbabwe, the land which recent settlers call Rhodesia. If I were to tell you that a war of liberation is unfolding in Rhodesia you would probably call it wishful thinking. You could be wrong.

Hardly anyone believes that anything revolutionary has ever happened in Rhodesia; and in spite of all that has happened, there are *still* people who do not believe anything is happening there. The execution of three patriots in March 1968 was

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perhaps the first indication to the outside world that something was happening.

Two of the men executed, James Dhlamini and Victor Mlambo, were members of Commando Crocodile, a youth group of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In its intimidation-pacification measures before the ban of both ZANU and the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) in June-July 1964, the government established an interrogation center in the remote eastern forests of Melster. Commando Crocodile was incensed at the brutalization of their comrades in the center and invaded it. They successfully held the camp long enough to free almost all of their friends. As they withdrew, a white farmer named Oberholtzer, with a carload of kids, sought to play hero and capture the group. The invading group tried to reason with him but in the end they had to deal with him. His family was not harmed. An informer named Mlambo and Dhlamini as members of the group, and Prime Minister Ian Smith rushed to make an example of them. That miscarriage of justice was the first real indication to the outside world that something was wrong. The true story of the two patriots will one day be told.

The third man executed was Duly Shadreck. He was accused of hitting back at an African chief who was terrorizing the people of his area to curry favor with the government. Investigation would reveal several cases of a similar nature in the last ten years. The trial of Shadreck refutes Smith's view that the chiefs are the preferred political leadership among the Africans of Rhodesia. Many of them would not last a day in the country if it were not for the government-provided bodyguards and a liberal supply of guns and ammunition. The chiefs were destroyed as a political instrument by the government itself 20 years ago, and no African accepts them in that role any longer. They are, however, an accepted government administrative institution; and when the people become angry with the government, they tend to strike at the nearest government administrative institution.

You could be wrong about Chimurenga's being wishful thinking. You may not understand or even believe in Chimuren-

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ga because there is a communications gap in thought, word, and deed between Rhodesia and the outside world, and an even wider gulf between the settlers of Rhodesia and the native peoples of Zimbabwe. Guerrilla war, skirmishes, raids, murder, subversion, political action, and freedom fighting have opposite meanings to the two groups inside the country, and perhaps a third by the time the stories reach the outside world. Since SAPA-Reuters, the organization which supplies the news from that part of the world, is an associated service of the all-white newspapers of Southern Africa, it is not surprising that little news of black people filters through, and what does filter through is only what the establishment wants to get through.

One thing, however, is certain; there is an insidious war ravaging the Zambezi Valley and spilling into the villages and cities all over Rhodesia. The settlers call it skirmishes, murder, and terrorism; the freedom fighters call it Chimurenga—the War of Liberation. I believe the war is rising in intensity and, as hate is pitted against hate, greed against poverty, and pride against patriotism, the tempo will rise year after year until nothing—not even reason—can stop it from destroying the whole land. Because of the course charted by Smith, a free Zimbabwe can emerge only out of that fire and destruction.

If Smith does not know it, it is time to point out to him that this is the meaning of UDI [Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, November 11, 1965]: for all who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course that cannot be altered. November 11, 1965, marked the turning point of the struggle for freedom in that land from a constitutional and political one to a primarily military struggle. To the Africans of Rhodesia, brought up and schooled in the missionary ethic that survives on conquest and serfdom, this shift is still difficult to comprehend. The settler, smug in his glass house of luxury and arrogance, comprehends it even less. It is a course that must end in victory or surrender.

Chimurenga made its acknowledged bow in Zimbabwe in April 1966, near the town of Sinoia, about 90 miles north of Salisbury, and about 60 miles south of the independent Republic of Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia.

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On that gray autumn morning, 30 young men slept uneasily under the stars in the bush 20 miles north of Sinoia, dreaming of great exploits and little knowing how close they were to one. This was their last day together, the day of the last briefing before they went into Rhodesia to do whatever they could do to liberate their land from the tyranny of white-settler rule. They had retired early because, they were told, the road ahead was uncharted and perilous. They were men of the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU.

Their dreams were shattered by the ugly rattle of machine guns at the sound of the second crow. One of Smith's patrols had tracked them down after days of patient scouting. ZANLA was forced to take a stand. They fought the whole day against odds they had never anticipated. As more of Smith's reinforcements poured in, ZANLA retreated into the night, leaving seven of their men "killed or injured" and four others captive. Those who returned to safety months later said they had counted "25 of the enemy killed or injured." They claimed also to have downed a helicopter and immobilized several of Smith's vehicles. Smith denied the casualty figures but conceded that a "skirmish" had taken place in which some of his men had been injured and several "bandits" captured in the Makuti-Sinoia area. The SAPA-Reuters story in the *New York Times,* April 30, 1966, was just as bland:

> Rhodesian policemen attacked a force of guerrillas 100 miles from the capital today, killing seven of them. . . . The Rhodesian government statement said the guerrillas were members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). . . . Today's incident was the first known clash between guerrillas and Rhodesia's security forces since Mr. Smith declared its independence last November.

Several clashes followed, each more protracted and fierce than the previous one. Smith was forced to acknowledge the existence of the guerrillas a month later, when a group of the "Sinoia band" struck in the Hartley area, 300 miles inland, almost in the center of the country. Four young men were "found" six months later who "confessed the murder" of the Hartley farmer and his family. The adult African population was invaded and harassed for months after the clash for failing to dis-

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close the presence of "these strange men with strange weapons." Several score of the men were detained.

In August-September several clashes were reported in the same Makuti-Sinoia area and elsewhere in the north and northeast. Fighting continued until the rains came in December. By the middle of 1967 clashes were reported at Feira, Rukomeshi River, Karoi, Nharire Hill, and several other places in the north and northeast. As survivors of these encounters appeared in court in Salisbury and other places, it was clear that a general military conflict was taking place in the Zambezi Valley. The government sought to confuse the public by instructing the prosecutors and judges not to disclose the names of the accused, where they had been captured, or the party to which they belonged; but these tactics did not work. The first group of 29 to appear on "terrorist charges" moved for treatment as prisoners of war. They argued that they were fighting an illegal regime, as the British government had characterized the Smith regime, and therefore no court could sentence them in Rhodesia. Four were sentenced to death and most of the rest to long prison sentences. Across the river in Zambia and in other African countries, ZANU claims did not reach the international news service. *Zimbabwe News*, a ZANU bulletin, claimed "208 of the enemy killed or injured during the year"; Smith's Minister of Law and Order, Lardner-Burke, claimed "100 terrorists injured or killed" during the year.

In their propaganda package, *Nowhere to Hide*, which is smuggled into Zambia and distributed to embassies and influential persons, Smith's information men conceded that the men encountered in the Valley were well trained and well armed, employing everything from small arms to machine guns, rifles, and bazookas. Smith has a well-trained army of white soldiers, and veterans who form an even larger reserve force, plus the remnants of the Kings African Rifles, formerly a Malawi unit. Smith is backed by South African force and military hardware that is substantial by any standards. What happens in that Valley when these two groups meet is what we call Chimurenga. "War ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction," said one world leader to

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another, "and a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it."

A new dimension was added to Chimurenga in July-August 1967 when the People's Caretaker Council-ZAPU group formed a unit with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). They opened a new front in the northwest Wankie Game Reserve forests. ANC is the oldest exile group of all southern Africa movements and has many more people outside the country than any other exile group. Some of these are extremely well trained. When the Smith forces attacked them in mid-August 1967, the attackers were in such straits that they had to call upon South African forces to come to their aid overtly. A London *Observer* correspondent reported hundreds of South African mobile units flown into Bulawayo, 70 miles south of the northwest ANC-ZAPU battle front. Jet bombers went into action and villages in the area were napalm-bombed. According to the Rhodesian establishment press, six Rhodesian soldiers were killed and one was wounded. To their great consternation, two of them were white. Twelve guerrillas were killed and 30 injured. According to the *Zimbabwe Review,* news bulletin of the PCC-ZAPU, "66 of the enemy were injured or killed." The battle continued to the year's end, when the rains set in.

A week after the three patriots were executed by Smith, March 6-9, 1968, Rhodesian soldiers were called out of cinemas by flash notices. Guerrillas were reported past Sinoia and very close to Salisbury, in the mining center of Mangula. Thousands of reserve troops were called out and the whole northeast frontier was inundated with soldiers. ZANU acknowledged that ZANLA had clashed with Smith forces on the old Sinoia-Makuti front. ANC-ZAPU claimed major victories in the northwest Wankie front and also in the northeast area of Miami. The two groups of the nationalist movement made counter claims of victory as the weeks went on, but it was obvious that a fierce war was in progress. This time it went on for months, into the winter in June. Smith's forces reported five of their soldiers killed in the first week and 14 guerrillas. About 50 guerrillas, pushing south, were reported to be "harassed and

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surrounded." After a month they disappeared into populated areas of the country. In the valley further north the war continued.

It is only two years since that first battle was fought by ZANLA, and already the "skirmishes" have developed into month-long battles. Guerrilla wars have a way of building their own momentum; they ebb and flow, but hardly ever disintegrate before the objective is won, a settlement reached, or the circumstances change. The second generation of guerrillas is usually better than the first. There is no reason to believe the Zimbabwe guerrilla war pattern will be different. Guerrilla wars can go on for decades, as in South America, without victory. Victory depends on the quality of leadership on both sides, and the circumstances pertaining in the land.

The preliminaries of the war in Zimbabwe can be traced as far back as 1959, when the African National Congress (Rhodesia) was banned. In the five intervening years there is considerable evidence of struggle. Among the news items you may have missed in the press are these: Trade Unionists Scott Chaguto and Mac Bhenura were sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment with hard labor for attacking the Excel Butchery with Molotov cocktails; in the southern town of Fort Victoria extensive damage was inflicted on the Electric Supply Commission installations by saboteurs using explosives; two ZANU youths were sent to jail for ten years each for derailing a goods train; six ZAPU youths were alleged to have thrown grenades at a flat in Salisbury; Professor Conradie (white) was sentenced to twenty years for being in possession of hand grenades and for belonging to a banned organization, ZAPU; Captain Shava of the Salvation Army was sentenced to seven years for possessing firearms. This catalogue could go on ad infinitum. It was the style of the nationalist movement before the change; it was political action to induce a change. Now it is only a complement to the main struggle, Chimurenga. The change came in 1963 and was characterized by turmoil and recrimination in the nationalist movement. The years 1964-1965 were the years of decision. On November 11, 1965, Smith fixed the seal. Chimurenga became inevitable.

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Trifling incidents, say our detractors and even our friends. Compared to Vietnam, yes. Compared to the final hour of Algeria, yes. But to Zimbabwians it has been a great breakthrough from the political-constitutional struggle to a military struggle. To the people of Zimbabwe and to the revolutionary movement of Africa, this was further than most had ever gone. The fact that the results have been inconclusive till now, and that fighting has been confined to areas within 100 miles of the Zambezi River may not be of crucial importance. What is important is that the direction of a genuine liberation movement has been established, and from now on it will be a matter of time, men, leadership, and support.

Of course there will be problems, and serious ones. Among them are recruitment, manpower, leadership, and the Cold War. The Zambezi Valley is sparsely populated, and movement into and out of the country for recruits remains a problem. Overseas students, who had seemed the best prospect, find it more convenient to be very good party members or, better still, very good nationalists with a greater cause than party, than to be freedom fighters after their studies. Being a freedom fighter requires more than they are prepared to offer for their land. Someone has suggested a one-year draft for every one of them on completion of their studies. This would not be a bad idea, for they are the ones who claim loudest to be patriots and they will benefit most from independence. It means offering their lives. The leadership's concept of the war is still more political than military. They think more in terms of the time when they will become the cabinet minister than of how to win the battle. Thus they restrict the role of the freedom fighters in the war. Even a guerrilla war is won by the military tactics, although politics is very important.

But perhaps the greatest problem is the Cold War, as evidenced by a recent manifesto of a new Rhodesian group called the Zimbabwe Democratic People's Party:

> ZAPU! no . . . no! ZAPU's treacherous toadying to the American dollar bodes ill for Zimbabwe .. . . ZANU! no . . . no! By their blind adherence to the chauvinistic, anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet

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absurdities of Mao, ZANU has proved finally that it is unfitted to lead the revolutionary masses of Zimbabwe.

Previous clashes at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Nicosia in 1967 and at the two subsequent meetings of the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference in Havana have shown clearly that Cold War considerations take precedence over the Zimbabwe Chimurenga. The Soviet Union is unhappy about the lack of orthodox Marxists in southern Africa and will counsel patience so that a "black imperialist" will not replace a "white imperialist." The United States will not touch anything which smacks of socialist revolution. The white establishment in power now is a safer bet for them and their money, although they may not like its politics. The only countries Zimbabwians can turn to are small countries with a genuine interest in freedom throughout the world: Sweden, Denmark, Czechoslovakia (before the tragedy), Yugoslavia, People's Republic of China, United Arab Republic, Algeria, Canada.

Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the Cold War, as far as Zimbabwe is concerned, is the role of the contiguous territories. Zambia, which is only four years independent and was economically bound to Rhodesia, will take a very long time before it can play the role of a North Vietnam without electing itself the candidate for the next coup d'état. The Congo(K), which is the only other possible North Vietnam, has not yet recovered from the effects of its own previous coup. Tanzania, 2,000 miles away, is doing its best, but it is far away. On the three fronts are enemies of the people. Without the proper kind of military support, can this war escalate into a major war? The vested interests of the area certainly would not like to see it develop into a war in which they may be forced to take sides openly. The squeeze on the contiguous territories will remain, and Chimurenga has all the odds against it.

But that is exactly what a war of liberation means. If it were otherwise it would be conventional. What is factual about it all is that unless Smith changes his strategy, and concedes power to the majority, the knot will get tighter, "until not even the one who tied it can untie it."

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

NEW CLOTH BOOKS

SOCIALISM IN CUBA by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy

Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy's new book on Cuba makes a sympathetic but realistic appraisal of the Cuban Revolution after ten years, and reaches some important new conclusions. The authors discuss health and education, where there have been truly amazing advances, and the economic field, where obstacles resulting from centuries of underdevelopment are formidable.

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THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy by Harry Magdoff



A collection of four articles that originally appeared in *Monthly Review*, plus an introductory chapter which discusses various approaches to the subject of imperialism. In the rediscovery of imperialism that is now going on, no work has been more important than that of Harry Magdoff, and the chapters which have already appeared have aroused enormous interest throughout the world. $6.00/54s

GUATEMALA: OCCUPIED COUNTRY by Eduardo Galeano



Eduardo Galeano, who lived with the guerrillas, gives a devastating picture of Guatemala, and a full account of the CIA-sponsored coup of 1954. He describes the Indian population, on whose aching shoulders the economy rests; the living conditions of a people three-fourths of whom live on less than twenty cents a day; and U.S. corporate exploitation and the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Special attention is given to the development of the guerrilla movement, and important guerrilla documents are appended.

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

The Socialist Register 1969 *will also be published in the near future, but we have no date as yet. Please wait for the announcement.*

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

LONG MARCH, SHORT SPRING: The Student Uprising at Home and Abroad by Barbara and John Ehrenreich

The authors are activists in the American student movement and traveled widely in Europe during the summer of 1968. In chapters on France, Italy, England, Germany, and Columbia University, they describe the events of the past several years to place them in perspective and trace the course of development in each locale. The concluding portion of the book develops an arresting theory of the worldwide student upheaval. $5.95/54s

THE EXPLOSION: MARXISM AND THE FRENCH UPHEAVAL by Henri Lefebvre



The author, one of the world's foremost Marxist sociologists and a professor at Nanterre, sets himself the task of beginning the reorientation which the events of the spring of 1968 in France are bound to inspire. Taking as a starting point the issues raised by the new world student movement—quality of life, spontaneity of revolt, possibility of self-management in industry and institutions, etc.—Professor Lefebvre's thought ranges far beyond the streets of Paris in his attempt to develop a theory of political power today. $5.95/54s



IRAN: THE NEW IMPERIALISM IN ACTION by Bahman Nirumand

Bahman Nirumand, an Iranian who was a professor in Germany until his recent expulsion from that country, here tells the story of the CIA coup in Iran in 1953, and the exploitation by the international oil consortium. The book, a best-seller in Germany when first published, played a role in inspiring the Berlin demonstrations against the Shah that heralded the modern German student movement. $6.95/56s

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This book, says David Dellinger, will be read "by thousands of bewildered experts in the U.S. military, diplomatic and foreign subversion agencies who cannot figure out on their own how the mighty United States could be so thoroughly defeated by tiny 'backward' Vietnam." (Published by *The Guardian*, distributed by Monthly Review Press; sorry, we can't offer an Associates' reduction on books we distribute for others.)
cloth $7.50/70s; paper $2.45/21s

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

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY by Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman

Widely regarded as the best book of its kind during the twenties and thirties, *Dollar Diplomacy* remains one of the finest surveys of the first decades of American foreign expansion. "Although written more than forty years ago, the book continues to be valuable for the light it throws on the early origins of an American policy which has been greatly accelerated and vastly widened in recent years."—*The Book Exchange.*

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CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA by Andre Gunder Frank



This paperback edition has been revised and enlarged with the addition of a new section on foreign investment in Latin America. "This book is very important because like none other it provides the economic and social basis to complement the political conclusions of Régis Debray: that is why I shall publish it in France."—François Maspero (Paris). "For Latin Americans, this book is the most important of its kind since Paul Baran's. It offers the theoretical economic groundwork for Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution?*"—Carlos Romeo (Havana). $3.45/32s



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

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

AMERICAN RADICALS edited by Harvey Goldberg

The American Historical Review has called this collection of essays on John Brown, Altgeld, Lloyd, Chapman, Debs, DeLeon, Haywood, Dreiser, Veblen, Beard, LaFollette, and others, "a stimulating collection, intelligently conceived, written, and edited." "A sympathetic, uniformly well-written study buttressed by a four-part introduction on American radicalism, past and present."—*The Booklist.* $3.45/32s

REGIS DEBRAY AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION edited by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy

The bulk of this symposium on Debray's theory of Latin American revolution originally appeared as the summer 1968 issue of *Monthly Review.* Four important essays have been added, by Juan Bosch, James Petras, Peter Worsley, and Gordon Lewis. "It is a pleasure to have these criticisms gathered into a book . . . this collection makes a fine, readily assimilated contribution to an understanding of the issues."—*The Kirkus Service.* $1.95/18s



PAN-AMERICANISM FROM MONROE TO THE PRESENT: A VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE by Alonso Aguilar

In this study of U.S.-Latin American relationships, Pan-Americanism emerges as the equivalent of the Co-Prosperity Sphere used by Japan in the heyday of its Asian imperialism. *Library Journal* notes: "This essay, written for the general reader, is just what it claims to be, 'a view from the other side' . . . the documentation, taken mostly from official and semi-official sources, will make any reader think seriously about the argument." $2.95/27s

THE VIETNAM SONGBOOK edited by Barbara Dane and Irwin Silber

A book of songs of protest, resistance, satire, and parody—from the United States, Vietnam, England, West Germany, Japan, Italy, Cuba, Australia, etc. Many have never appeared in print before. The foreign songs appear in English as well as in the original language. The music gives melody line and guitar chords and each song is illustrated by scenes of war and protest. Includes songs by Tom Paxton, Pete Seeger, Phil Ochs, Ewan MacColl, and many others. (Published by *The Guardian,* distributed by Monthly Review Press; sorry, no Associates' reduction.) $3.95/34s

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CORRESPONDENCE

The French Explosion

Since parts of my *New Statesman* letter were made the target for the Review of the Month (September 1968), may I reply? First, critics of French Communist policy are safe in the knowledge that as capitalist newspapers (99 percent) suppress Communist statements, it is not possible for their readers to study those parties' reasons for their actions. Thus, opponents may ladle out more half-truths in a few pages than twenty short replies could cover.

To pretend that a revolutionary situation existed, or could easily be caused to exist, in Paris is to ignore the fact that four trade union groups went their own ways; that the students were divided between numerous ephemeral groups, many obviously penetrated by police agents; that the *mass* of peasants and farmers had not begun to move; that the urban petty bourgeoisie was being hurled back to de Gaulle (as a Communist leader said: "Every burned car is a thousand votes for Gaullism"); that all but a few vanguard factories were putting forward *economic* demands. The massive Gaullist rally of May 30 arose from a sudden triumphant *realization* of this disunity, from the refusal of Left Federation and PSU leaders ("*I* should be prime minister," "We will silence de Gaulle!") to join immediately with the majority working-class party, the CP, to hammer out a joint platform. *The CP was forced, time and again, to maneuver to avoid being trapped into self-isolation.*

Lenin's classic description of a revolutionary situation did not apply, and for a number of reasons could not have been made to apply. To draw parallels between Russia in 1917, a huge, lumbering, war-destroyed hulk, and advanced capitalist states in 1968, with their untouched, mechanized, often fascist-led, military, naval, and air reserves and over fifty years of experience of (and warning of) street revolutions is dangerous. In any case, even in

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shattered Russia, eight months passed before the desperately necessary unity was adjudged by Lenin to have arrived. Had the CP last May erred on the side of audacity instead of passivity, a civil war would have been joined. Tank divisions, air squadrons, paratroops, would have been thrown in. (The capitalist class uses riot sticks against its student sons and daughters, however heroic, but napalm and 105 mm. guns against workers' revolution.) The working class, divided tragically between three parties and many groups, and between four main trade union organizations, could not have won, and would not have emerged for decades. (If the chances of winning had miraculously been as high as "events," one still has to examine the results of defeat with far more seriousness than the Review of the Month seems prepared to do.)

Anyone studying the CP's statements on the situation (why not print some of them? They are historical documents of some import!) finds every point made by MONTHLY REVIEW more than answered. The Review of the Month, however, reads like some obedient rehash of the more cunning bourgeois "glossy" newspapers, with a dash of the ravings of the peanut-sized trot-mao-anarchist splinter groups. Heady optimism vies with black pessimism and anti-election bravado, interspersed with such remarks as "we do not pretend to have made" the necessary "analysis and assessment," competing with a host of "not necessarilies" and "when we have the answers . . . we shall be in a better position." Yet not one single word from the statements of the major French working-class party. Why? Because to print such dangerous material would be to cut the ground from under thirteen pages of sterile anti-Communism. (I do not deny that a number of serious and thoughtful points are made, points which should be carefully studied and, often, learned from—even if the sour anti-Communism raises the question whether it is worth it.)

The lessons of disunity in France will be learned in long, often bitter discussions. The *real* failings and the political statements of *each* party—CP, LF, and PSU—and of the various student groups, will be analyzed. Out of it will come advance. Nothing is to be gained by obediently carrying out capitalism's one inescapable demand: "Attack the CP's and we won't count you as really beyond the pale!"

Ken Geering

Sussex, England
October 20, 1968

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Reply by the Editors

We have read Mr. Geering's letter and, whether he is prepared to believe it or not, the most important statements and documents put out by the French CP on the May events. We have also read a lot more by many other authors, French and foreign, since the September Review of the Month was written. The upshot is that we are more than ever convinced that the main thesis of that piece is correct. Gilles Martinet, in an interesting study of the May explosion (*La Conquête des Pouvoirs,* Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1968) writes: "The movement of May was profoundly socialist. The flourishing burst of red flags expressed not only the survival of a rite but the affirmation of a rebirth. The mass of the demonstrators—and not only the young—spoke and acted as though radical transformations had suddenly become possible." (p. 97) Remember that ten million workers were on strike! And it was in *these* circumstances that the CP concentrated its efforts on keeping the students and workers apart, limiting the workers' demands to purely economic issues, and shunting the whole struggle into parliamentary-electoral channels. Mr. Geering may be able to convince himself that these were the actions and attitudes of a revolutionary party; we cannot.

Mr. Geering tells us that all sorts of dreadful things would have happened if the CP had "erred on the side of audacity." The truth is that he doesn't know what would have happened, and neither do we. But it is also true that no revolution ever was or ever will be made by leaderships which are not prepared to "err on the side of audacity."

Mr. Geering's final admonition is somewhat outdated. There is plenty of evidence that the Gaullist regime in France counted heavily on the CP to bring it safely through the crisis, and in many parts of the capitalist world today the pro-Moscow Communists are indispensable guardians of the status quo. Capitalism's one inescapable demand has to be reformulated: "Attack the real revolutionaries, inside or outside the CP's, and we won't count you as really beyond the pale." There are no more franchised revolutionaries in the world today; we are back in a period when actions speak louder than words.

On the Events in Czechoslovakia

Thank you very much for publishing my letter of July 14

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in the issue of January 1969. Now, six eventful months after the writing of that letter, I still agree with almost everything I said in it. But some things I did not say need to be added now.

Five forces stand out in Czechoslovakia.

First, the Muscovite apparatus, represented by the official Warsaw Pact forces.

Second, the remnants of the local "legitimate" branch of *an earlier stage of development* of the Muscovite apparatus in Czechoslovakia, the Novotny forces, defeated and disorganized by the popular upwelling that began to gather force at the beginning of 1968, led mainly by the trade unions and the youth.

Third, the "vital local Reds," acting as a vanguard for socialism west of China, who wish to turn Czechoslovakia decisively away from "market socialism," toward a deepening of revolutionary ideology, culture, and practice.

Fourth, students and intellectuals, whose desire for democratic revolutionary socialism was diverted into support for "social democrats," who on many occasions have diverted the people from worldwide revolution by using socialist slogans to lure people into counterrevolutionary nationalism. The Marcusian ideology of the student movement helped to divert the students from a world-revolutionary strategy to a self-defeating anarchist non-strategy.

Fifth, and to be ignored only at fatal peril, a group typified by Eugene Loebl, Ota Sik, and others who wished to put Czechoslovakia on a path of social democracy as opposed to socialism: the social democrats who moved in on the situation. Eugene Loebl, a very high official in the Dubcek government, has said, since the intervention, that he regards the United States as it presently exists as the highest form of socialism; and that is the kind of society that he was trying to establish in Czechoslovakia. Social democracy is the "welfare state" without public ownership of the means of production. It is the leading form of imperialist liberalism in the present era. The strategy of the social democrats since the First World War has been to isolate socialism in one country, and to weaken, subvert, and defeat it there. This social democracy is attempting to infiltrate the Soviet Union and China from west to east, and there is greater danger there. Socialism isolated in China alone would serve the social democrats as well as socialism isolated in the Soviet Union alone. Sik was preparing the way for this move to the Right by abolishing central planning and replacing it with a free market economic system. Small private enterprises were being established and enlarged in such businesses as

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taxicab fleets, laundry chains, etc. With a free market to move into, these enlarging private businesses would have eventually expanded in size and scope and have swamped the public sector of the economy; and laws to facilitate this consolidation of counterrevolution would have been passed under the white flag of liberalization and political democratization, as is happening in Yugoslavia. With counterrevolution consolidated in Czechoslovakia, it would have swept through Eastern Europe and into the Soviet Union, as master imperialist strategist Herman Kahn has candidly pointed out in print. He had thought that the USSR had degenerated so far into imperialism that it would just make a deal with the West to establish a new power status quo in Eastern Europe on the basis of social democracy rather than socialism there. Instead it fought for its ideology. Kahn was shattered. This is a good thing, not a bad thing.

Of course if the Soviet Union had not led Eastern Europe down a path that led away from the fight for socialist ideology in everyday affairs, a crisis would not have arisen requiring the Soviet Union to be deeply embarrassed by invading a sister socialist country in order to fight for socialist ideology. However, many on the Left mistake the import of the Soviet decision. It indicates some degree, at least, of health rather than malady that in the crunch she did fight for socialist ideology rather than surrender totally and opportunistically to social democracy and imperialism, and thus sink into a hopeless slide into those degenerative vices that so deeply endanger the Muscovite establishment. The Muscovite establishment must face and solve its problems in a revolutionary and democratic manner, and not falsely use Maoism as a scapegoat to divert attention. If the establishment does not lead the people to accomplish this, the people will try to accomplish it without the establishment. As we have seen, there is danger of openings to capitalist intriguers and to war as well as hope of progress in such a development.

The peaceful overthrow of the Novotny bureaucrats by the trade unions, mainly, was one of the most hopeful signs ever in Eastern Europe. What a tragedy it was that the people, under the leadership of the trade unions that unseated the Novotny clique, did not decisively take power in the period of confusion that followed the overthrow, excluding social democratic neo-capitalist intriguers. This could have been done peacefully and without violating socialist legality.

January 15, 1969 *Bernard Edwin Galitz*

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

First in War: First in Peace

The War Resisters International compiled a "Prisoners for Peace 1968" list which includes those known to be serving prison terms because of their anti-war, pro-peace activities. The list does not pretend to be complete. Its authors write: "We know that there are many more people in prison because they have refused to have anything to do with militarism." This list of persons now serving sentences imposed for obstructing or resisting war was printed by *Peace News* in its December 6, 1968, issue.

Australia, East Germany, and France reported one prisoner each.

There were four in Switzerland, seven in the Soviet Union, and thirty-nine in Spain.

In the United States there were 147.

The United States is spending more for military preparations than any other country on earth. The United States has produced more people who are willing to serve jail sentences for anti-war activities than any other country. The United States is first in war expenditure and first in its list of people who are openly struggling for peace by resisting war.

On European Unification

J.J. Servan-Schreiber has written a book about European unification that has attracted much attention in Europe and elsewhere. The title of the book is *The American Challenge* (published in New York by Atheneum). Its theme is the rapid increase in United States investments in France, West Germany, Belgium, and other countries of Western Europe. The increase involves a partial economic occupation by the United States of some of the most strategic areas of the Western European

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economy. The chief causes for the success of this invasion are superiority in higher education, in expenses for research, and in the techniques of organizing and administering Big Business corporations. If this invasion continues, the U.S. will dominate and control critical sectors of capitalist Europe's economy.

As Servan-Schreiber sees this threat to European self-determination, there is but one avenue of escape. European leadership must get together and pull together, coordinate and modernize its economy, through united action meet the challenge of the invasion, and restore Europe's independence of United States overlordship.

Historical events have not favored European unity in the past. After a thousand years of bitter Europeans wars, dismemberments, military occupation, shifted boundary lines, economic exploitation, cultural coercion, and national loyalties, fears and hatreds of neighbor countries are widespread; the abysses separating European peoples from one another are deep and wide.

Repeated economic and political efforts to unify Europe during recent years have been defeated by Europe's strident nationalisms. With Europe's fifteen centuries of disunity, hatred, and civil war, plus the present clever footwork of the CIA and the ponderous thrust of U.S. investments, the probabilities are that European unification will be further postponed.

Incidentally, the talk is not of unification of Europe, but of Europe's western half. Eastern (socialist) Europe seems to be separated from Western Europe by a broad deep moat dug by the late John Foster Dulles and other sharp-eyed wreckers.

Wanting Peace and Making Peace

The World Council of Peace, in its final Information Bulletin for 1968, published an appeal for a world peace assembly. "Nineteen sixty-nine marks the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the world movement for peace. . . . Twenty years ago we outlined the basic principles of the movement.

"Prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction and ending of the arms drive; abolition of foreign military bases; general, simultaneous, and controlled disarmament

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"Elimination of all forms of colonialism and racial discrimination

"Respect for the right of the peoples to sovereignty and independence, essential for the establishment of peace

"Respect for the territorial integrity of states

"Non-interference in the internal affairs of nations

"Establishment of mutually beneficial trade and cultural relations based on friendship and mutual respect

"Peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems

"Replacement of the policy of force by that of negotiations for the settlement of differences between nations."

Nowhere among these principles is there any suggestion for a peace-making apparatus. If you want education, you build a school. If you want to communicate, you build a post office. If you want peace, you must establish a world authority capable of maintaining law and order and making war improbable.

Freedom Is as Freedom Does

William Saunders was born in Tsarist Russia in 1898. At the age of five, in 1903, he was brought to the United States, where he has resided ever since. Professionally, he is a retired commercial artist. In his spare time he paints portraits, landscapes, seascapes.

Saunders served in the United States army during the 1941-1945 war. With his honorable discharge from the armed services he could have claimed United States citizenship, but he had assumed that as an infant he had obtained citizenship through his father; and since he was taken without question into the army, he made no move to be naturalized.

In 1953, at the height of the McCarthy witch hunt, Saunders was picked up and held on $2,000 bail. Questioned by immigration officers, he admitted having attended Communist meetings during 1936. He was ordered deported to Russia. Soviet officials refused to admit Saunders, on the ground that he was born a citizen of Tsarist Russia and that with the 1917 revolution Tsarist Russia had disappeared.

When Saunders returned to the United States, immigration authorities placed him under "probationary parole." For sixteen

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long years he was required to report regularly to the immigration service, where he was questioned concerning his activities. Immigration officers visited his employers time after time, causing him to lose one job after another.

On January 10, 1969, deportation proceedings against Saunders were dropped as a result of a recent hearing. If all goes well he will end his long and trying period of official parole surveillance.

The American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, which handled the Saunders case, notes that this is but one example of persecutions under the "cruel and undemocratic McCarran-Walter Immigration Act." Saunders has finally escaped its penalties. Others less fortunate have not. While it remains on the statute books it can be used to persecute and penalize American residents who suffer the disadvantage of being foreign born.

Another Rich Harvest in China

Peking Review for December 13, 1968, published a front page announcement and a longish story headed: "Under the Impact of the Great Cultural Revolution China Gathers a Rich Harvest in 1968." The article aimed to summarize the results of the year's farming. "Autumn harvesting has been completed in the main throughout China. Reports of bumper harvests have come in from all parts of the country." In all cases there have been "fairly big increases in grain output over last year. . . . Rich harvests or fairly good harvests have been gathered in Szechuan. . . . China also had a bumper cotton crop this year. . . . The bast fibre crops, silk-worm cocoons, tea, tobacco, and fruit all gave excellent yields, and the oil-bearing crops were fairly good."

The balance of the two-page article on 1968 crop yields is devoted to reports of peasant classes studying Mao's writings, and the extent to which Chinese agriculture is following Chairman Mao's directives.

The closing paragraph of the article reads as follows: "The poor and lower-middle peasants and other commune members, with proletarian feelings of boundless love for Chairman Mao and the socialist motherland, are enthusiastically delivering and

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selling grain, cotton, and other farm produce to the state. They pledge to carry out the tasks put forward by the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Party's Eighth Central Committee. Supported by the PLA, Mao Tse-tung's thought propaganda teams are purifying the class ranks conscientiously, energetically conducting struggle-criticism-transformation and building more water conservancy projects, devoting greater attention to winter production and displaying the spirit of building the country and running the people's communes with diligence and thrift. All this is in preparation for a new upsurge in agricultural production and better harvests in 1969."

The article does not contain a single figure dealing with the volume of the 1968 harvests.

"New Type" Education in China

Western educators are watching developments in China with close attention. Three years ago Mao Tse-tung closed the schools and colleges of China, provided the youth with food, shelter, and transportation and told them in effect: "Travel around the country, use your eyes, ears, and tongues. Learn all you can. When you complete this project, we must get together and do something about middle and higher education." Mao added these suggestions: "The period of education should be shortened; education should be revolutionized; and the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue."

The official Hsinhua News Agency on October 11, 1968, released a report on a new-type school which integrates theory with practice and works along the lines proposed by Mao. The report deals with a middle school on the Wu Kow Tea Plantation in Wuyuan County, Kiangsi Province. It was established in 1965 "for part-time tea growing and part-time study."

The school aims "to give prominence to proletarian politics, put Mao Tse-tung's thought in command of everything, condense and improve the courses, closely combine study and collective labor, and study for the purpose of applying what one learns." The school is under the control of workers and poor and lower-middle peasants.

The school staff consists of four full-time teachers, one of

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whom is in charge. "It invites workers, tea-growing peasants and technicians of worker origin to give lectures." Results to date are described as "very good."

Another aspect of China's new education is outlined in a special directive from Mao publicized in Hsinhua's selected News Items, December 30, 1968: *"Chairman Mao's Latest Instruction.* It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres and other city people should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle school, college or university to the countryside. Let's mobilize. Comrades throughout the countryside should welcome them."

Under this directive, which is accepted as revealed law in present-day China, the finishing school for all young people is to be a period of considerable duration spent in one of China's 800,000 villages as the guests of the village and under the supervision of the poorer and lower middle-income families.

Chinese peasants' life is lived generally on a pre-industrial level. This is particularly true of the poorer villages and the poorer villagers. Under the new Mao directive this will be the atmosphere in which both village children and city children will finish their education and prepare to take their places as citizens in New China.

Technologically speaking the task of New China is to increase the role of industry and commerce in the overall Chinese economy. People's China is moving from a predominantly agricultural village level to a predominantly industry-commerce level. Presumably, during the active lifetime of present-day Chinese teenagers, which will run from about 1970 to 2010, industrialization will proceed at least as rapidly as from 1950 to 1970. As adults, the teenagers of the present will be functioning in a rapidly expanding industrial society. The youngsters now being finished off in China will be primarily responsible for making this change. Where will they get their experience? Since Chinese educators aim at uniting practice with theory, should not an increasing proportion of China's youth be "finished off" in industrial and commercial environments?

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

handle at once, so that there will inevitably be delays in filling some orders.

Our information from London is that Ernest Mandel's two-volume *Marxist Economic Theory* will be put on shipboard in the near future. We very much regret the long delay in filling orders for this title; but since this is a joint venture with a British publisher and since production is in London and not New York, the causes of the delay have been entirely outside our control.

An old friend and long-time MR Associate, Norval Welch of Guardian Tours, has offered us an interesting proposition. He will turn over to MR one half of the commissions earned on any *foreign* travel booked by MR readers through Guardian Tours. Whether you are going to Europe on one of the popular auto/rail programs, taking a sabbatical abroad, or traveling overseas on business, we urge you to help MR by booking through Guardian Tours (see ad on p. 57). Norval does a good job, and the financial benefits to MR could be substantial. Be sure to state in any correspondence with Guardian Tours that you want MR to get credit for your order.

In his "Reply" published in the February issue, Régis Debray wrote: "*Revolution in the Revolution?* would surely not have attracted your attention had it not been for the events in which I found myself caught up and imprisoned, the publicity which surrounded or distorted them, and above all the overwhelming shadow of Che." Lack of time prevented us from correcting this impression in last month's issue. The facts are that Debray's book was called to our attention by the Cubans as soon as it was published in Havana and that we began work on the English translation way before Debray's name had hit the headlines.

It is with sorrow that we received the news of the death by assassination on February 3rd of our friend Eduardo Mondlane, the head of the Mozambique Liberation Front, usually called FRELIMO (see the article by Glyn Hughes on FRELIMO in the December 1968 issue of MR). His loss will be a serious blow to the African liberation movement, putting increased burdens and responsibilities on his colleagues and co-fighters. To them and to Eduardo's wife Janet we send our condolences and encouragement to carry on to victory the struggle he so ably led.

The Italian edition of MR has a column in every issue entitled "Ai Lettori" (To Readers). We would be grateful if some Italian-speaking reader would volunteer to translate these columns for us. Send us your name and address, and we will see that you receive the Italian edition regularly.

We have just received from London a copy of the January 31st issue of *Tribune,* the left-wing weekly, containing a review by Malcolm Caldwell of Edward Boorstein's *Economic Transformation of Cuba.* We quote the opening sentences in the hope that they may provide inspiration to some American teachers in the field of economic development: "Mr. Boorstein's book is a masterpiece in the grossly inflated literature of economic development. More is to be learned from it than from study of a dozen ponderous standard texts by establishment professors of the subject. I very strongly urge everyone interested in development problems (that should, of course, be all of us)to read this book—it is going straight on to my students' reading lists."

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